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ABSTRACT
The Effect of Hegemonic Masculinity in the Proportion of Women in Post-Communist
Parliaments: A Case Study of Estonia and Poland
Anne Moreland

The underrepresentation of women in national parliaments is a phenomenon that plagues much
of the world, with the Baltic Sea Region being no exception. Two countries, Estonia and Poland,
are chosen for comparative analysis in this paper, as they possess different cultures and histories,
but have similar proportion of female representation at the national level. The comparison
provides insight into the situation women face in politics in two post-communist states in Central
and Eastern Europe. This paper will examine the trends in the proportion of female
representatives in Poland and Estonia’s national parliaments in the transition from communism
to democracy and post-transition periods. The work seeks to conceptualize why women in
Poland and Estonia continue to be grossly underrepresented in the upper echelons of power by
employing R.W. Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity
explicates the cultural force that both dominates and subordinates femininity as well as other
masculinities, thus resulting in low proportions of women in the national parliaments of the new
countries examined. Three time periods are developed for a fuller analysis of changes in the
number of women seated in the upper echelons of power: the communist period, the transition
period, 1989-2004, and the post-transition period, 2004-2012. The work notes the changes in
gender equality policies in each country after accession to the European Union in 2004 and
explores the possibilities of greater gender equality in each state.
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INTRODUCTION
Though women make up over half of the world’s population, they only make-up 21
percent of the world’s parliamentarians. 1 This reality is no different in the post-communist states
of Europe. The noticeable low proportion of women in national parliaments continues to be
prevalent in the post-communist states, despite the past socialist ideology of gender equality and
transition to democracy. The number of women in a national parliament of a country can be
used as a barometer of gender equality, namely the qualitative amount of equality or inequality
witnessed in a country’s power structure. By looking at the percentage of women in a national
parliament throughout different periods of transition, one can see correlations form between the
number of women in a parliament and the amount of gender equality legislation that is created.
Although the women at the top are an elite, they are elected representatives, and the
trends among women engaged in politics make for an interesting study in the overall climate for
gender equality in a country. Additionally, the percentage of women in national politics in any
given country can show a shift in gender norms and gender roles, which can represent a change
in a society overall. In examining such a microcosm as women’s representation at a national
level in a society, one is able to look at the bigger picture of gender equality with more clarity
and greater insight. The focus on female parliamentarians at the national level is not intended to
exclude the importance of women at a regional and local level, and the topic is certainly in need
of further research, but extends beyond the scope and aim of this work.
With this, a more specific examination of the post-communist experiences of two
countries, Estonia and Poland, could yield interesting insights into the phenomenon of low
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numbers of women in the national parliament. The countries differ drastically in size, with
Estonia having almost 1.3 million inhabitants and Poland possessing over 38 million, but both of
their parliaments contain relatively small percentage of women of around 20 percent. Both
countries experienced a severe drop in female representatives at the time of transition in the early
1990s and both continued to have low numbers of women present in the national parliaments and
governments. As is demonstrated in both case studies and expanded on in the thesis, the more
women in parliament and a more international presence has shown an increase in public
discourse on gender equality and an increase in policies that promote gender equality in all
sectors of society.
Estonia, as a former part of the Soviet Union, provides an example of a small country that
has made great strides in its transformation from a Soviet republic to one of the luminary Baltic
States. The country is commonly cited as one of Europe’s least religious countries, yet possesses
traditional views on gender in its society, with women being assigned to the domestic sphere and
men holding responsibility for the public sphere. The country also possesses the greatest pay gap
among men and women in the European Union, with women making only 77 percent compared
to the wages and salaries of their male counterparts.2 Estonia also looks to its Nordic neighbors
in many ways, from diplomacy to culture, but has not yet adopted the rigorous gender quotas and
policies that the Nordic states have enforced in their countries. Although Estonia is a small
country in the north-east of Europe, with its Soviet past and traditional cultural values, it
provides a very interesting and complicated backdrop for analysis of trends among female
parliamentarians.
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Poland, on the other hand, experienced domestic communist rule, under the influence of
the Soviets, and has also made great progress to integrate with its near Western neighbors,
particularly Germany. Poland can be seen as the stronghold of Catholicism in Europe, citing
almost 90 percent of its population as Roman Catholics and 75 percent of its inhabitants actually
practicing the religion.3 The traditional gender roles associated with Catholicism are accepted
throughout the majority of Polish society. Poland has been at the center of the abortion debate for
its conservative views on the procedure, leaving some to criticize Poland as hostile to women’s
concerns. Poland, after leaving behind communism, has emphasized its past traditions, leaving
women in a difficult position in an increasingly modern society. As the largest post-communist
state of the former Soviet bloc, Poland provides an interesting contrast to Estonia in an attempt to
understand the position of women in the respective societies.
Despite possessing different cultures, languages, values, and histories, the two countries
have experienced the same outcome in regards to the proportion of female representatives in the
national representative bodies. The two countries provide a fruitful comparison in regards to the
post-communist experience, the presence of a fervent nationalism, and the treatment of gender
equality. Both Estonia and Poland experienced Soviet rule, have successfully transitioned to
democracy and capitalism, and have joined the European Union, thus providing a solid
foundation for comparison.
This thesis explores further explanations for low numbers of women in national
parliaments than what is contained in the existing literature by examining the social foundations
of gender and how the concept of hegemonic masculinity, theorized in R.W. Connell’s 1987
seminal work, Gender and Power, can help explain why women continue to be grossly
underrepresented in national bodies. The thesis adds to a vast array of literature that explores the
3
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conditions and challenges faced by women during the democratic transition in Central and
Eastern Europe. The period after and around 1999 leaves much to be desired in the literature on
women in the post-communist states, notably Poland and Estonia. Though certain years and the
corresponding elections have been explored, a comparison of two more recent members to the
European Union and the effects of the gender equality policies and directives is warranted.
Additionally the examination of the different types of females that rise to the leadership position
within Estonian and Polish politics is warranted by delving into the profiles of a few female
parliamentarians from each case study.
Three periods will be examined in each case study: the communist past, from the end of
the Stalinist period, the transition to democracy, which, in this work, will span from 1989 to
2004, and the post-transition period, 2004-2012. The three periods develop a fuller picture of the
percentage of women in national parliaments and the relation to the development of gender
equality policies and overall public awareness. The period of the communist past is examined to
provide background in order to better understand the situation women faced and their role in
communist power structures in each case study. The period spanning from 1989-2004 is explored
as the time before both states became full members of both NATO and the European Union, thus
affecting their policies of gender equality. The period 1989-2004 is considered in this thesis as
the transition period, from communist dictatorship to multiparty political systems and from
centrally planned economies to free market economies. Additionally, during the period of 19892004 each country held at least four democratic elections for the parliament. Finally, the period
from 2004 to the present period, described here as post-transition, shows the effects of accession
to international bodies on the proportion of female representation in the national parliaments of
Estonia and Poland.

4

The overall research question of this work is why are women, even after regime change
and the development of democracy, significantly underrepresented in national parliaments and
governments in the post-communists states? Furthermore, this study seeks to answer what
explanations could be put forth to explore the inherent gender inequality in the upper echelons of
power in these states? Additionally, have Estonia and Poland evolved in their gender equality
policies from above, through legislation, and if so, what were the catalysts? The hypothesis of
this thesis is that women in the cases of Estonia and Poland have been continuously unequal in
representative bodies because the hegemonic masculinity and the gender norms of their cultures
prevent equilibrium between the sexes of being established in the decision-making institutions of
the state. Moreover, the concept of hegemonic masculinity, explored later in this work, describes
a malleable rather than a static phenomenon, allowing for change in a society’s view of gender,
masculinity, and femininity and thus for more female representatives, as was witnessed
throughout the 1990s and 2000s in both case studies.
The research method of this study consists of secondary source analysis, the use and
analysis of data from surveys conducted through different time periods in each country
(including Inglehart’s World Values Survey), and analysis of governmental legislation on gender
equality. Additionally, for more contemporary information and data, a survey was sent out to
female parliamentarians electronically in the language of the respective country, gauging the
views and beliefs of current female parliamentarians in regards to contemporary issues that face
women in each country.
The work will begin with a review of the relevant literature that has been written on the
topic of female representation in post-communist parliaments. The literature review explores two
main themes found within the literature, namely the challenges faced by women in the transition

5

period and the divide between the East and West on the place of feminism in the post-communist
societies. From there, the work will explore the theoretical models and methodological
approaches used in the thesis. R.W. Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinity will be
explored, along with later academic discourse on the concept. The theoretical section employs
the use of secondary literature that explores the notions of masculinity and femininity in a
society, and how these concepts prevent women from gaining equality on all levels, and thus can
be seen as a contributor to lower numbers of women in national parliaments in Estonia and
Poland. The first case study, Estonia, will then be examined following the time periods set out
above. The fluctuations of women in the Riigikogu will be analyzed in an attempt to show that
the hegemonic masculinity present in Estonian society has prevented women from occupying
more seats in the parliament. The second case study, Poland, will be examined in a parallel way
with similar purposes. From the case studies, a comparative analysis will be developed in
showing the presence and the effects of a hegemonic masculinity in each country in regards to
female representatives in the national parliaments and the overall climate for increased gender
equality in each country. Finally, some concluding remarks with recommendations for future
study are developed.

6

CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The underlying gender relations and the prevalence of hegemonic masculinity in the
cultures of the post-communist states are acknowledged in the academic work and historiography
that has been written on the transition and post-communist situations of Central and Eastern
Europe. The exploration of women’s challenges during the periods has been covered quite well
by a number of authors, most of whom are women. The literature on the transition and the posttransition era is essential in understanding the situation that women faced in each of the
respective time periods before an examination of the specific cases of Estonia and Poland can be
explored. Two prevailing themes can be dissected from the literature, one that focuses on the
challenges women faced after the transition and the emphasized divide between the East and the
West in regards to the place of feminism in the post-communist states.
However, before the two themes of the literature can be expanded, a look at the Soviet
and communist past and the common experiences of the women in the societies of Poland and
Estonia much be briefly examined in order to contextualize the transition and post-transition
literature. An exploration into the role of women in Soviet ideology is necessary to understand
the position women faced during communism as well as at the transition, and the contradictory
ideology they hoped to rid themselves of in the new government and society.
Soviet ideology encouraged women to participate not only in the workforce, but also in
the political realm. The 1917 Russian Revolution saw the takeover of power by Lenin and the
Bolsheviks and a complete reworking of Russian society based on the egalitarian communist
7

ideology. The Bolsheviks sought to create a communist utopia, looking for the participation of
all citizens in society, including previously marginalized women. Lenin emphasized the need for
the equality of women in Soviet society, noting, “In capitalist society the women’s position is
marked by such inequality that her participation in politics is only an insignificant fraction of
man’s participation.”4

Lenin attempted to improve the lot of women, theoretically, by

contrasting the ideal Soviet society with the detested and unequal capitalist society of the West.
Wendy Goldman highlights, “Capitalism, according to the Bolsheviks, would never be able to
provide a systematic solution to the double burden women shouldered.” 5 Despite the Bolsheviks’
hope for equality among all citizens, women continued to face the double burden of being
caretakers of the domestic realm and active participants in the workforce in Soviet society,
alongside their female counterparts living in capitalist societies. Barbara Einhorn points out the
Marxist argument, stating, “The origin of patriarchal relations of domination and subordination
was capitalism, therefore—so went the reasoning---the elimination of this root cause would
automatically preclude gender inequalities in personal relations.” 6 By eliminating capitalism, as
Marxism implied, gender inequality would cease to allow for the cultivation of an equal society.
This, of course, proved to be idealistic and unreflective of the reality.
Unfortunately for Soviet women, the reforms of the Bolsheviks towards the ‘woman
question’ were lumped together with overall social reforms, rather than being given special
attention.7 However, the Bolsheviks’ hope for a “socialization of household labor,” which would
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eliminate the domestic role of the woman, was never achieved, leaving women in charge of the
realm of domesticity. 8 Furthermore, although the Communist Party continued to include women
in their social reforms, the implementation of Stalin’s Constitution in 1936 proclaimed women as
equal in practice, thus closing for discussion the question of women’s equality and role in the
workplace. 9 Even though communist ideology sought to improve the lives of women by making
them equal to their male comrades, that equality was symbolic rather than literal, leaving women
to be further marginalized within society.
Gail Lapidus provided an eloquent look into the lives of women in her 1978 aptly titled
work, Women in Soviet Society, by examining various aspects of life, previously overlooked, of
the Soviet woman as well as the historical events that led to the double burden of women under a
seemingly egalitarian system. The equality of men and women in the public and private realms,
as foreseen by Lenin, led to the gradual inclusion of women into the political realm during the
1920s and 1930s in Russia. As Lapidus notes, “Full political participation for women depended
on the political democratization that would accompany the transformation of economic
relationships.”10 Theoretically as more women were included into the industrial workforce in the
Soviet Union, the greater the occurrence of political participation in elections and party life, and
the closer they came to reaching the ideal equilibrium with their male comrades. This, of course,
did not occur the way the Soviets envisioned, but rather, women continued to face a double
burden despite the public discourse of perceived gender equality.
The landscape of Europe after World War II saw the acquisition of numerous territories
by the Soviet Union, including Estonia. Estonia became one of the three Baltic republics to be
acquired by the Red Army military success and Stalin’s diplomatic achievements at the end of
8
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the war. Stalin was also able to exert his influence over much of Central Europe, which included
Poland. The communist ideology of gender equality extended to the Soviet bloc, but the
domination of the Soviet Union was not greeted with enthusiasm in the majority of the countries.
However, despite the gender quotas that called for a certain amount of representation in the
committees and platitudes to the ideology of equality, women remained marginalized and
subordinated by men. Therefore, when Estonia became a Soviet republic in 1940 and Poland
became a restored state under the influence of Soviet style communism in 1945, the women of
those states, though they were indoctrinated with the idea of gender equality, experienced the
intensification of the double burden and rejection from any real equal political representation in
national representative bodies and party central committees. These trends continued until the fall
of the USSR for Estonia in 1991 and the end of communist rule in Poland in 1989.

1.1 Challenges of the Transition

In addition to the loss of social benefits and the increase in economic burdens, women
lost a significant portion of their parliamentary seats after the elimination of the gender quotas
guaranteed under communism. Women’s representation in national parliaments at the time of
transition fell from an average of about 30 percent in the latter years of communism to less than
10 percent, and as Richard Matland and Kathleen Montgomery highlight, some countries had
below 5 percent of women in their national parliaments after the fall of communism. 11 Matland
and Montgomery note further, “More than a decade after founding democratic elections in the

11
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region, the mean level of female representation, at around 12 percent, remained slightly below
the world average (14 percent) and well below the Western European mean (25 percent).”12 The
significant drop in women’s presence in parliaments as well as the unequal hardship faced by
women during the transition was noted and examined by many scholars, leaving a vast literature
on the topic.
A range of trying changes affecting women in the societies in transition was witnessed
during the shaky regime change from communist to democratic governance in the early 1990s.
The appearance of a free market economy brought about a drastic rise in unemployment, a
phenomenon that had been virtually unknown in communist times. Women were particularly
affected, comprising 70 percent of the unemployed throughout the 1990s. 13 Continued high rates
of domestic violence and economic discrimination prevented greater gender equality in newly
democratic societies, and these trends were reinforced by the resurgence of traditional cultural
norms and mores.14
Along with these trends, the double burden of women in society of being expected to
provide for the family both domestically and economically prevented the growth of the political
activism that would help to persuade the general public of the need for reform in the realm of
women’s issues. “This comparison between past and present within East Central European
countries reveals an absolute drop in female representation. On average, women held about one
third of the seats in state socialist parliaments. By contrast they account for less than one in ten
parliamentarians in most of the democratically elected parliaments,” according to a study of the
12
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early 1990s. 15 The arrival of capitalism, like communism, required women to be responsible for
contributing to the household income as well as taking care of domestic responsibilities, hence
the continuation of the double burden. The consolidation of the double burden under communism
left a bitter taste in many women’s mouths in regards to feminism and women’s liberation,
promoted more in communist propaganda than in practice. The issues facing women under
communism continued to plague the paternalistic societies with the arrival of democracy, leaving
women behind in governmental affairs and preventing the establishment of greater gender
equality as a whole.
Facing economic hardship, experiencing discrimination in all facets of society, and losing
many social welfare services that had been provided by the Soviet or communist government in
many cases, women were in an undesirable situation throughout the post-communist sphere at
the time of transition. Furthermore, the revamping of nationalist fervor in many countries led to
the reappearance of traditional gender roles, although they arguably never disappeared but were
disguised under communist ideology. 16 Tanya Renne edited a collection of essays devoted to
examining the “Sisterhood of Europe,” and an extensive quotation from her introduction
provides great insight into the discourse on the resurgence of nationalism, and subsequently, the
subordination of women at the time of transition:
National customs and traditions were embraced with a rediscovered enthusiasm,
and religion began to occupy a primary place in many people’s lives. With these
new pleasures and responsibilities, most countries harkened back to former “free”
periods, periods before World War II, Nazi occupation, and Soviet “liberation.”
New conservative politicians sought to bring their countries back to “true,”
untainted-by-communism identities. 17
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These “untainted-by-communism identities” required a reversion to the past, in which traditional
gender roles were promoted and enforced through cultural norms and values. The historiography
of the situation on women during the transition period continuously points to the reversion to
past values and the importance of naitonalism. These past values further subordinated and
burdened women in those societies in transition, placing more responsibility on women to remain
in the realm of domesticity while the economic situation required their presence in the labor
force. One place women were not responsible for with the revival of nationalism was the realm
of politics and government, leaving this a traditionally male-dominated arena.
Barbara Einhorn, in her much cited Cinderella goes to the Market, written in 1993,
argues that “the ambiguities in the situation of women both “before and after”: namely, that,
despite clear improvements in the civil and political rights associated with democratic
citizenship, in the short run at least women in East Central Europe stand to lose economic, social
welfare, and reproductive rights.”18 Einhorn recognized the inequality experienced by women
both before and after the transition, pointing to the lack of hope that accompanied the democratic
transition for the women of East-Central Europe. Despite gaining an open area for public
discourse, namely civil society, women lost their social benefits, such as daycare, and many of
their reproductive rights, as seen with the outcome of the abortion debate in Poland in the early
1990s. Einhorn correctly noted, “Moreover, a newly dominant discourse threatens to subordinate
women’s citizenships rights in many cases to the goals of nationalist projects.” 19 The reversion to
nationalist practices and ideas not only attempted to erase all aspects of communism, including
many of its social benefits, but it also further subordinated women in post-communist society.

18
19
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Einhorn noted, “the shift from opposition “anti-politics” to democratic “normalization”…
is marked by a tendency to oust women.”20 The tumultuous transition to democracy continuously
marginalized and even subordinated women, rather than including women in the decisionmaking processes of regime change. Einhorn further explored explanations as to why women’s
citizenship was marginalized during the democratization process in Eastern and Central Europe,
providing a foundation for further research. Following Einhorn, the appearance of essay
collections from numerous authors, such as these produced by Gal and Kligman, Jacquette and
Wolchik, and Funk and Mueller, appeared in an attempt to examine women’s situations
throughout the former Soviet bloc by providing comparative approaches. 21
Perhaps the most unique work to come out on the discourse on women in transition is
Jacquette and Wolchik’s comparison of Latin America and Eastern Europe, which provided a
very interesting analysis of democratic transition in two very different environments. The
common denominator for comparison of the two regions was that both transitions left a ‘legacy
of fragility.’22 They argued that “…the abruptness of the transitions in Central and Eastern
Europe highlighted the lack of past democratic experience in much of the region and the
destabilizing potential of right-wing nationalism.”23 Jacquette and Wolchik’s comparison, though
seemingly unlikely, sought to demonstrate that the lack of democratic foundations and traditions

20
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in many of the countries allowed for the rise of right-wing nationalism and the reemergence of
values that had been embraced before the arrival of communism and authoritarian regimes.
Importantly, Jacquette and Wolchik noted, “The struggles for democracy have also been
struggles for identity, and in both regions, post-transition identities were built in part on rejection
of the modes and policies of the prior regimes.”24 This point is important especially for the
republics that were part of the USSR, such as Estonia. The transition period was not only a
transition to democracy but also a transition for national identities and cultural values to be
shifted away from Soviet norms and toward traditional values. Unfortunately, both sets of norms
and values subordinated women and overlooked them in the processes of government.

1.2 East Vs. West

The fall of communism sent a chaotic wave of change across the former Soviet bloc, with
previously communist nations adopting democratic institutions and a free-market economy. A
discourse developed at the time of transition among Western and Eastern female academics and
writers, debating the causes for the decline in the situation of women throughout Central and
Eastern Europe as well as the potential role of Western-style feminism in the newly democratic
nations. The discourse among the authors cited a reversion to traditional values after the fall of
communism as the cause of a severe drop in the proportion of women in national parliaments and
often focused on the dichotomy of “East vs. West” in terms of feminist thought. The authors, at
times, developed in-fighting on the academic level over abstract ideas rather than providing

24
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concrete aid in improving women’s situations in the transition to democracy. 25 The differing
views of women’s role in society between Western players and post-communist women are one
of the root causes of the failure in developing a solid women’s movement throughout the postcommunist bloc. Views of women as part of the collective group under socialism differ greatly
from the views of women as individualist actors under capitalism. Different histories, cultures,
and values are important explanations for why the Western feminist movement has not taken off
successfully in Central and Eastern European countries. This discourse continued throughout the
1990s until the number of elections in the countries increased and the number of women in
parliaments gradually rose, which generated new criteria for analysis rather than a simple
explanation for why Western feminism was not vigorously adopted in the post-communist states.
In addition to examining the rise in nationalist sentiments that marginalized women
further from participation in political institutions, the literature about the transition examined a
seemingly inherent conflicting dichotomy of Eastern vs. Western women and the implementation
of feminism in the newly democratic nations. The literature often suggests that with the adoption
of Western feminism, women’s issues would be acknowledged and solved through the
democratic processes, though Western feminism had also recently faced its own idiosyncrasies
and gray areas in the Western democracies. At the same time, however, the literature points to
the lack of interest of Eastern European women in the concept of feminism. Einhorn wrote,
“Unlike the West, where any gains in equality of opportunity or the elimination of discrimination
on grounds of sex have been the outcome of prolonged political struggle from below,
governments in state socialist countries were officially committed to a policy of women’s

25
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“emancipation,” to be achieved through legislation and social policy.” 26 Women in Eastern
Europe did not have to struggle for their emancipation in the latter part of the 20 th century, but
received it through the state and its policies, according to Einhorn.
Einhorn continued by writing of an “allergy” to feminism in Central and Eastern
Europe.27 Additionally, Tanya Renne noted at the time of transition, “Although independent
feminism is relatively new to Eastern Europe, it is clearly unwelcome; many in these changing
nations see it as a threat.”28 The reluctance of Eastern women to take in Western-style feminism
continues to the present, with “feminism” or “feminist” having negative and foreign
connotations. Laura Busheikin attempted to uncover certain myths about feminism, but her
account was written at a time when cooperation was still hopeful. 29 However, the idea of
importing Western-style feminism into Eastern Europe was seemingly hopeless, given the
region’s past experiences and nationalist propaganda against the evils of feminism. The tension
between the two camps in academia came to a battle of words and ideas between Nanette Funk
and Slavenka Drakulic.30 Drakulic, a journalist, pointed out that Funk, a Western academic, did
not understand the situation of women in Eastern Europe, but instead insisted on the use of
feminism to solve all of Eastern Europe’s woes. This discourse of East vs. West was only
occurring at the level of academia or among NGOs, providing no discourse or basis for women
who could potentially create a grassroots movement for women’s issues. The academic infighting over Western-style feminism seemingly overlooked the past experiences and histories of
the women as well as men under communism, leaving Western feminists with few ideas that
seemed attractive to the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe.
26
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The seemingly radical Western feminism carried negative connotations among Central
and Eastern European women, leaving many to deny that they were “feminist,” even if they had
feminist leanings and beliefs. 31

Although there were a few women, mainly scholars and

activists, who took on the term “feminist,” the majority of women during the 1990s, sought
change while adhering to traditional cultural norms and mores. Cultural feminism, as defined by
Kristen Ghodsee, “often aims at meeting women’s special needs within the status quo.”32
Instead of embracing and working with the cultural feminism seen within the post-communist
states, “Western feminists and their local counterparts have ignored the complex historical
legacies of socialism versus what has been called “bourgeois feminism” in the East.”33 The
different histories of Western countries like the United States and the post-communist states, for
example, led to conflicts in semantics within not only the women’s movement in different postcommunist countries, but also on a global level as well. It is through these complex legacies and
rejection of Western ideals that the successes and failures of women’s movements in postsocialist Europe lie, making the movements intriguing cases for analysis of the progress of
women in societies undergoing dramatic change after the fall of communism.
Ghodsee goes on to refer to this Western feminism as a type of “cultural feminism,” the
idea that women and men are essentially different and therefore, women should all unite into a
common sisterhood, that Western NGOs have used as an ideology, implementing it into the
views of local women’s NGOs. 34 Many radical feminists, a very small minority within Central
and Eastern Europe, advocate for complete change and even erasure of gender roles, but
31
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Ghodsee states that cultural feminism in Eastern and Central Europe “looks to find solutions for
how the worst offenses of patriarchy can be mitigated, while never challenging the social or
economic relations within which patriarchy thrives.”35 The cultural feminism that the Western
NGOs are importing reinforces the view that women are in fact different from men and should be
treated as such, rather than as equal partners in society. Although Western feminism views itself
as promoting the stance of women within countries in transition, they are in fact, promoting the
separation of women from men.

The separation resulting from the ideology of Western

feminism is doing very little to change the views of men and women in regards to a necessary
change in gender relations to address persisting inequalities.
Additionally, the problematic use of “feminism” in post-communist society carries with it
a weight of negative connotations evoking fantastical images of women who scorn men, rather
than women who are simply seeking equality with their male counterparts. But it is through the
cultivation of an increased number of women representatives in national parliaments, a
successful and flourishing women’s movement, and the work of women’s groups in political,
domestic, and economic realms that the term “feminism” will eventually lead to positive
connotations among citizens, both male and female. This is not to say that the term “feminist,”
with its façade of Western hegemony, must be adopted into the discourse on gender equality, but
perhaps if the term is revisited for its content rather than its associations, a fuller understanding
of the necessity of greater gender equality in a democratic state might be realized.
The academic debate in the 1990s on why Western-style feminism was not being
accepted in Eastern Europe perhaps missed the bigger picture of why there was inequality with
the transition to democracy in the first place. The relative absence of feminism and a large
following of feminists cannot be viewed as the sole reason for the drastic decline in women’s
35
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position in post-communist societies. Richard Matland and Kathleen Montgomery write,
“Communism usurped the language of feminist emancipation, but in praxis women were
marginalized across economic, political, and social spheres. As a result, women found
themselves at a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis men in competitive elections; and feminism was
thoroughly discredited as an ideology and basis for political action.” 36 The rejection of feminism
was historically founded, yet the debate continued among western and eastern academics,
leading to the muddling of possible solutions to the problems women faced.
It is from the foundation of the literature that has been written on women in the postcommunist transition and through the application of the concept of hegemonic masculinity that
the case studies of Estonia and Poland will be examined. The exploration into the experiences of
women in politics in Estonia and Poland will begin with a brief look into the situation of women
under communism in the specific countries, an examination of the trends of the election of
women into the representative democratic institutions, and a look into the cultural values and
norms that promote or hinder the election of women, almost a quarter of a century after the fall
of communism.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 The Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity

Many explanations have been put forth in an attempt to understand the steep decline in
female representatives in post-communist governments in the first years of transition, as well as
the continuation of gender inequality in political institutions of power in contemporary postcommunist states. An additional inquiry into why women failed to gain equality in representation
under communism is also warranted in order to understand the contemporary situation more
fully. The failure of the communist system to fully liberate women, placing women in a double
burden of housework and employment left many women at a severe disadvantage to their male
counterparts at the beginning of the transition in the early 1990s. These factors are often cited as
leaving women apathetic towards politics and preventing them from running for office or
becoming representatives in their governments. This apathy, as the argument follows, leaves
women out of the upper echelons of power. This is a simplification of complicated arguments
and research on women in post-communist societies, but a look into the cultural foundations of
the gender inequality through both the communist and post-communist eras in these societies
could prove fruitful for further analysis.
Although those arguments certainly have shed insight into the experiences of women
during communism and the post-communist transition, perhaps the low levels of participation in
political institutions of women can be explained in a different way by examining how women
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and men are viewed within each society, what stereotypes are present, and what forces are at
work that have caused inherent gender inequality. An intriguing concept that employs and
analyzes the representation of men and women in a given society emerged in the 1980s with
R.W. Connell’s work on sex role theory. In his work, Connell denied the singularity and static
nature of the male sex role and explored the concept of hegemonic masculinity and its effects on
the workings of gender and sex in a society. 37 Sex role theory focused solely on the dichotomy of
male and female, and their respective roles in society, leaving no room for the malleable nature
of social roles. More recent research has found that sex role theory also failed to recognize the
“existence of a multiplicity of femininities and masculinities” and placed anything that did not fit
neatly into the dichotomy of male and female, such as transsexual, into a third category of
‘deviance’ rather than seeking to expand the views on gender relations. 38
As Connell wrote in his 1987 seminal piece, Gender and Power, “The large-scale
structures of gender relations are constituted by practices.” 39 The larger structure of gender
relations in the post-communist states can be seen in the continuous election of a large
proportion of men to the national representative bodies, as well as the continual and consistent
appointment of men to top government positions. The practice of continually electing men to
positions of power keeps women from occupying these positions, but furthermore from
becoming equal with men in the larger structure of gender relations. Looking at the state as a
source of inequality, Connell argued that “the state both institutionalizes hegemonic masculinity
and expends great energy in controlling it.” 40
37
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representatives in political institutions which possess state power, one can begin to understand
the social structure of a society by looking at the more micro-level social structure of an
institution, such as a national representative body. Through looking at the relations and
interactions between the sexes, one can begin to understand the foundation for the inequality
seen in the upper echelons of power. Therefore, in addition to examining why women are underrepresented in political institutions in Poland and Estonia, this thesis seeks to understand how
inequality between the sexes has persisted despite ideological and governmental changes and
whether the future holds hope for greater equality.
Connell’s ideas on masculinity and the male sex role emerged out of work associated
with second wave feminism that attempted to understand the sources of patriarchy and gender
inequality in modern society. Hegemonic masculinity allows for an interesting perspective on
problems identified in feminist literature, including the continuation of patriarchy and gender
inequality in the post-modern era. Connell was able to contrast much of his work with the ideas
of the emerging feminist literature, providing a perspective that often went unnoticed in that
literature, such as his notion of present and multiple masculinities and a subordinated femininity.
Demetrakis Demetriou, adding to Connell, explains, “Patriarchy is therefore not a simple
question of men dominating women, as some feminists have assumed, but it is a complex
structure of gender relations in which the interrelation between different forms of masculinity
and femininity plays a central role.” 41 Demetriou offered a critique of Connell, but also pointed
to the importance of examining gender relations.
Connell complicates the idea of masculinity by noting, “Masculinity is not a fixed entity
embedded in the body or personality traits of individuals. Masculinities are configurations of
practice that are accomplished in social action and, therefore, can differ according to the gender
41
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relations in a particular social setting.” 42 Masculinity is not static in the sense of a physical being
or concrete traits, but it evolves over time, embracing different characteristics that it may deem
threatening to its hegemonic status. By basing his argument on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony,
Connell found many basic similarities in class and gender relations, pointing to intricate power
relations between the groups that lead to domination and subordination. 43 However, in Connell’s
terms, “Hegemony did not mean violence, although it could be supported by force; it meant
ascendancy achieved through culture, institutions, and persuasion.” 44 Hegemonic masculinity,
though the idea entails a version of a male that is violent and aggressive, is not violent in and of
itself, but is peaceably incorporated into a society by its people’s practices. Furthermore, as
Justin Charlebois explains, “The complementary and hierarchical relationship between
masculinity and femininity implies domination through consent and not force (i.e., hegemony).”
45

Therefore, masculinity retains its hegemonic power within a culture through the acceptance

and consent of a people, rather than by overt force or explicit propaganda.
Connell’s study of hegemonic masculinity then looked “to how masculinity constructs
dominance and remains in control.” 46 The retained dominance of a singular masculinity is
reinforced by the continued performance of cultural norms and values that allow for the
hegemonic masculinity to keep all other masculinities, as well as women and femininities,
subordinate and marginalized. Connell and Messerschmidt write:
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Hegemonic masculinity was not assumed to be normal in the statistical sense;
only a minority of men might enact it. But it was certainly normative. It
embodied the currently most honored way of being a man, it required all other
men to position themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimated the
global subordination of women to men. 47
The characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, based on a Western ideal, characterizes the male
as heterosexual, competitive, powerful, aggressive, economically successful, and stoic.48 It is the
ideal of ‘masculine’ and being a ‘man’ that is continuously reinforced through norms and
practices that allow this ideal to retain its hegemony. Hegemonic masculinity is very public and
portrayed continuously in the media, allowing it to appear as if all men should possess the
emphasized characteristics, when in reality the majority of men do not. 49 The masculine
characteristics, therefore, often occupy the public realm in society, the realm that possesses the
majority of overall power. The normative power of hegemonic masculinity allows gender
inequality to continue to be institutionalized and continued throughout generations, as well as
changes in regimes.
It was through the denial of the singularity of the male sex role found in sex role theory
that Connell developed the idea of the existence of multiple masculinities in a culture, with one
set of norms and ideas possessing hegemony over the other masculinities as well as enforcing the
subordination of women and femininity. Furthermore, Demetriou examines two types of
hegemonic masculinity; internal hegemonic masculinity and external hegemonic masculinity.
Within the first type, hegemonic masculinity possesses control and power over the other,
subordinate masculinities. A subordinate masculinity, in this sense, can be characterized as
possessing distinctly feminine characteristics, like being nurturing or emotional, or can be seen
in the characterization of homosexuality in males.
47
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Demetriou expands on the internal hegemony by saying, “hegemonic masculinity is not a
purely white or heterosexual configuration of practice but it is a hybrid bloc that unites practices
from diverse masculinities in order to ensure the reproduction of patriarchy.” 50 For example,
homosexuality does not conform to the inherent heterosexual nature of hegemonic masculinity,
therefore, it is deemed undesirable and marginalized through cultural norms and discourse.51
Interestingly, the idea of masculinity in a culture can change from generation to generation,
making the hegemony malleable. As Connell and Messerschmidt explain:
….hegemonic masculinity appropriates from other masculinities whatever appears
to be pragmatically useful for continued domination. The result of this dialectic is
not a unitary pattern of hegemonic masculinity but a ‘historic bloc’ involving a
weaving together of multiple patterns, whose hybridity is the best possible
strategy for external hegemony. A constant process of negotiation, translation,
and reconfiguration occurs.52
Despite the undesirable characteristics of the marginalized or subordinate masculinities, some
characteristics that are deemed threatening are engulfed by the hegemonic masculinity to ensure
the reproduction of patriarchy. Therefore, with the appearance of a new masculinity, whether it is
through the appearance of a new ethnic group or a new social or political movement, the
“exemplary masculinities will have to adapt accordingly” to retain the hegemonic position.53
The subordination of women, or emphasized femininity, by men, or hegemonic
masculinity, is the base for Demetriou’s idea of an external hegemonic masculinity. However,
before examining Demetriou’s external hegemonic masculinity, Connell’s notion of emphasized
femininity must first be considered. Describing the nature of emphasized femininity, Connell
wrote, “It is the global subordination of women to men that provides an essential basis for
differentiation. One form is defined around compliance with this subordination and is oriented to
50
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accommodating the interests and desires of men.” 54 The form that is compliant with the
subordination and accommodating to the interests and desires of men is the ‘emphasized
femininity.’ Though the emphasized femininity is subordinate to the hegemonic masculinity,
Connell completes his view of gender relations by noting,
It does not imply that hegemonic masculinity means being particularly nasty to
women. Women may feel as oppressed by non-hegemonic masculinities, may
even find the hegemonic pattern more familiar and manageable. There is likely to
be a kind of ‘fit’ between hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity. 55
Thus, masculinity and femininity, though not equal in a given society, provide a cap on the
tension that is organically present in gender relations. Connell continues by noting in a later
work:
…women are central in many of the processes constructing masculinities—as
mothers; as schoolmates; as girlfriends, sexual partners, and wives; as workers in
the gender division of labor; and so forth. The concept of emphasized femininity
focuses on the compliance to patriarchy, and this is still highly relevant in
contemporary mass culture.56
It is this compliance to patriarchy by the virtue of emphasized femininity that prevents women
from obtaining equality with their male counterparts and ending male hegemony in political
institutions.
It is the emphasized femininity, lacking any sort of hegemony even within its own
category, which is subordinated in Demetriou’s concept of external hegemonic masculinity
rather than the other masculinities. This external form of hegemonic masculinity both
subordinates the emphasized femininity as well as relies on its subordination and continual
marginalization in order to exist. According to Demetriou, the concepts of masculinity and
femininity are themselves built upon a foundation of domination and, therefore, produce gender
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inequality. It is this inequality that makes up gender relations and practices, and is subsequently
and continuously reinforced throughout generations, despite the hybrid nature of masculinity.
Accordingly, Demetriou succinctly writes, “Hybridization is thus a strategy for the reproduction
of patriarchy.”57 The ever-changing nature of hegemonic masculinity, through its internal and
external nature, along with the role of women in constructing and supporting masculinities allow
for the hegemonic status of masculinity in society.
Connell’s idea of an emphasized femininity, however, has come under criticism for its
inability to address the multiplicity of femininities that exist, that like hegemonic masculinity,
continually evolve. Mimi Schippers writes of multiple femininities that can co-exist in a culture,
as well as the existence of a hegemonic femininity. Hegemonic femininity, however, evolves and
changes to support the subordination and dominating features of hegemonic masculinity.
Schippers expands on Connell’s implication that multiple femininities do exist, but notes that
Connell focuses more on the multiple masculinities rather than on examining the supportive
characteristics of the multiple femininities to the reproduction of patriarchy. 58
Pyke and Johnson, in their study of white femininity and Asian femininity, emphasize the
relation between hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity by noting:
We are not arguing that hegemonic femininity and masculinity are equivalent
structures. They are not. Whereas hegemonic masculinity is a superstructure of
domination, hegemonic femininity is confined to power relations among women.
However, the two structures are interrelated with hegemonic femininity
constructed to serve hegemonic masculinity, from which it is granted
legitimacy. 59

57

Ibid, 349
Schippers, 87.
59
Karen D. Pyke and Denise L. Johnson, “Asian American Women and Racialized Femininities: ‘Doing’ Gender
across Cultural Worlds,” Gender and Society, 17, 1 (February 2003), 50-51.
58

28

Pyke and Johnson point out some very necessary ideas in understanding the relationship between
the two hegemonies. While hegemonic femininity holds power to dominate and subordinate
other femininities, it is still subordinate and dominated by hegemonic masculinity.
Schippers supplements Pyke and Johnson as well as Connell by exploring subordinate
femininities, which she calls pariah femininities, and hegemonic femininity. Schippers expands
on hegemonic femininity from the characteristics of masculinity by noting, “To complement
these characteristics in a way that subordinates femininity to masculinity, femininity includes
physical vulnerability, an inability to use violence effectively, and compliance.” 60 The
characteristics of femininity are antonyms to the characteristics of masculinity, but these
antonyms imply a lesser value in the culture and society rather than a simple oppositional
category. The hegemonic femininity does not exist to overpower or eventually take over
hegemony from masculinity, but it exists to prevent the subordinate or marginalized forms of
femininity from becoming a threat to the hegemonic masculinity. It is the enforcement of both
hegemonic femininity and masculinity in the culture of a nation that perpetuates the quantitative
inequality of women in governmental representation in post-communist states.
The characteristics of subordinate, or pariah, femininities that are stigmatized “include
having sexual desire for other women, being promiscuous, ‘frigid’, or sexually inaccessible, and
being aggressive.”61 These characteristics deviate from what is expected of the relationship
between masculinity and femininity and threaten to assume characteristics of hegemonic
masculinity, making it very important for these femininities to be contained by the hegemonic
femininity. Schippers prefers the term ‘pariah femininities’ because these femininities are not
necessarily inferior, but possess a threat to the relationship between masculinity and femininity
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that would normally allow for the domination and subordination of women. Pariah femininities
are seen as not being vulnerable, able to use violence, and assertive in a way that is noncompliant to the subordination of women via hegemonic masculinity.
The characteristics taken on by pariah femininities, Schippers notes, are not seen as
masculine qualities, but as both feminine and undesirable. 62 The qualities, such as being assertive
or attracted to women, usually associated with masculinity, are no longer seen as masculine
when associated with pariah femininities, because associating females with masculine
characteristics could threaten the hegemony of masculinity. These seemingly masculine qualities
when enacted by the pariah femininities are ‘simultaneously stigmatized and feminized,’63
removing the ability for them to become a threat to hegemonic masculinity. Justin Charlebois
adds to Schippers by stating, “Significantly, pariah femininities threaten to dismantle the
heterosexual matrix and remove hegemonic masculinity from its extolled position.”64 Therefore,
the job of hegemonic femininity, in a sense, is to contain the undesirable qualities that are present
within Schippers’ term “pariah femininities.”
Schippers writes further, “It is cultural insurance for male dominance that anybody who
enacts or embodies hegemonic characteristics that do not align with their gender category is
stigmatized as problematic and feminine.” 65 It is this insistence on associating the feminine with
undesired characteristics that perpetuates gender inequality in a culture. Even if the female
exhibits characteristics of hegemonic femininity, she will not be able to exude characteristics
associated with males in leadership positions for fear of those characteristics being stigmatized
and seen as unnatural for a woman. Even women who do not possess the characteristics of
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hegemonic femininity must face stigmatization for not following the norms of hegemonic
femininity, but also for not adhering to the necessary hierarchy for ensuring peaceful or
institutionalized gender relations and the subordination of hegemonic masculinity.
With this, it can be argued, that women in powerful positions, such as a parliamentarian
or Minister in a government, must continuously possess the qualities of hegemonic femininity in
order to be accepted culturally. However, even within the parliaments, the women who are
present are continuously marginalized by their male counterparts, other women parliamentarians,
as well as by the normative nature of their cultures. Women must embody masculine
characteristics in order to enter into the realm of politics and be seen as equals, or they must
continue with their emphasized femininity in order to create a balance. However, Schippers,
points out that this is seemingly impossible for women to achieve, since women exuding
masculine characteristics are never seen as masculine, but are degraded to being abnormal or
feminine and women exuding feminine characteristics are resigned to subordination by
masculinity. Thus, along with the presence of pariah femininities in institutions of power,
marginalized masculinities and femininities may pose a threat to the structure of gender relations
through certain characteristics they possess. Despite the ability of the subordinated masculinities
and femininities to potentially topple the structure, it is the unique ability of hegemonic
masculinity to incorporate those threatening characteristics into its own discourse, thus recreating
hegemonic masculinity, and preventing it from being overtaken.
This, however, is not to say that hegemonic masculinity could not be overtaken or that
the existing regime of gender relations could not be rattled. Demetriou and Connell focus on
gender relations, highlighting the importance of the interaction between masculinity and
femininity. Connell and Messerschmidt write:
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Gender relations are always arenas of tension. A given pattern of hegemonic
masculinity is hegemonic to the extent that it provides a solution to these tensions,
tending to stabilize patriarchal power or reconstitute it in new conditions. A
pattern of practice (i.e., a version of masculinity) that provided such a solution in
past conditions but not in new conditions is open to challenge—is in fact certain
to be challenged.66
It is argued by Connell and Messerschmidt that hegemonic masculinity exists in order to provide
a release for the tensions within gender relations. Connell uses the term ‘gender regime’ to
explain the ‘the state of play in gender relations in a given institution.” 67 The seemingly concrete
gender regime of hegemonic masculinity in any given institution continues to determine gender
relations, always coming out on top.
Opposition to the gender regime that has subordinated women throughout the decades
can be seen in various women’s movements. The women’s liberation movement in the United
States called patriarchy into question through its demands for gender equality; yet, men still
dominate institutionalized power.68 It is with this failure of the women’s liberation movement
that Demetriou notes “…the hegemonic bloc changes in a very deceptive and unrecognizable
way. It changes through negotiation, appropriation, and translation, through the transformation of
what appears counter-hegemonic and progressive into an instrument of backwardness and
patriarchal reproduction.” 69 It seems as though the change and transformation of the hegemonic
bloc associated with the subordination of women is never-ending, leaving women forever
marginalized and excluded from equal participation in the public realm.
Despite the bleak outlook for a continuation of an unequal gender regime, Connell and
Messerschmidt do offer solutions to the issues of gender inequality. Connell and Messerschmidt
write of the contestation of hegemonic masculinity that
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…occurs continuously, through the efforts of the women’s movement (at the
local, regional, and global levels), among generations in immigrant communities,
between models of managerial masculinity, among rivals for political authority,
among claimants for attention in the entertainment industry, and so on. The
contestation is real, and gender theory does not predict which will prevail—the
process is historically open. Accordingly, hegemony may fail. The concept of
hegemonic masculinity does not rely on a theory of social reproduction. 70
The idea that the gender regime and hegemonic masculinity can be toppled, allowing for a new
hegemonic power to take its place, is intriguing. Hegemonic masculinity is not required to be
reproduced, but most certainly has retained its position in the post-communist states of Poland
and Estonia, as well as elsewhere across the globe.
Furthermore, Connell and Messerschmidt write that the “conceptualization of
hegemonic masculinity should explicitly acknowledge the possibility of democratizing gender
relations, of abolishing power differentials, not just reproducing hierarchy.” 71 Connell supports
the idea of a ‘politics of alliances’ that combines forces that would dismantle hegemonic
masculinity. 72 Despite regime change in Central and Eastern Europe, hegemonic masculinity
remained on top, reforming itself to envelop democratic ideals while retaining masculine
tendencies that prevent gender equalization. Additionally, the transition from communism to
democracy and capitalism and the nascent women’s movement that appeared in Central and
Eastern Europe did not usurp the old gender regime, but, in many cases, evolved the hegemonic
bloc into one that embraced nationalist and traditionalist values, again leaving women outside of
the realm of power and inside the walls of domesticity.
It is with the idea that hegemonic masculinity continually suppresses equalization in
gender relations and reinforces the subordination of women in power structures, that the
examination of trends in female representation in Poland and Estonia will be considered.
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Hegemonic masculinity can be viewed on a local, regional, and global level, according to
Connell. Connell wrote, “It is possible for the local pattern to depart from the global pattern,
even to contradict it. Such departures may provoke ‘policing’, i.e., attempts to establish the
global pattern locally as a norm. They may also signify structural tension that leads to large-scale
change in the longer run.” 73
Central and Eastern Europe constitutes a region that has gone through the transition
from communism to democracy and capitalism in recent history, making the examination into
the foundations of hegemonic masculinity and its role in gender relations intriguing at a regional
level. Connell and Messerschmidt expand by saying, “… regional hegemonic masculinity
shapes a society-wide sense of masculine reality and, therefore, operates in the cultural domain
as on-hand material to be actualized, altered, or challenged through practice in a range of
different local circumstances. A regional hegemonic masculinity, then, provides a cultural
framework that may be materialized in daily practices and interactions.”74 With the admission
of Poland and Estonia to the European Union, a further regional, even global, set of norms,
ideals, and concrete laws and directives were imported into the increasingly globalized
societies. The influx of globalized norms, including gender equality, into the post-communist
states has adjusted the hegemonic power of masculinity to where gender inequality has become
part of public discourse. More importantly, the admission to the EU witnessed the adoption of
directives and laws to aid in greater gender equality in both Poland and Estonia. The laws and
directives help to enforce the idea of gender equality, and its importance for the future of the
two countries within international organizations, and potentially reshape the concept of
hegemonic masculinity at a regional level.
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Despite the presence of different cultures in Poland and Estonia, a similar hegemonic
masculinity reigns in each culture, preventing women from meaningfully obtaining power
positions. Additionally, the identification of hegemonic femininity and oppositional femininities
in the cultural and regional context will be important in examining the continuation of gender
inequality in political institutions in both Poland and Estonia. The European Union also
provides an additional gender regime to take into consideration in contemporary Estonia and
Poland, carrying the potential for a shift in gender relations towards equality.

2.2 Methodology

This study was completed with an interdisciplinary purpose, relying on a variety of
sources from both a historical and contemporary pool of work. A comparative case study of
Estonia and Poland was chosen in order to analyze the effects of Connell’s concept of hegemonic
masculinity on the proportion of female representatives in a national parliament in two postcommunist states. The comparative case study allowed further analysis of hegemonic
masculinity within different cultures and also allowed hegemonic masculinity to be better
demonstrated in the political institutions of these two countries. By looking at two separate
societies, the effects and presence of hegemonic masculinity appears more prominent than if only
a single post-communist state were to be examined.
An overview of the historiography and history in regards to gender equality of each
country was completed, as it is their past and culture that seemingly makes each country
different, yet they continue to have similar results in regards to the proportion of female
representatives at a national level. The work also relies on secondary source analysis in regards
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to its theoretical framework, taking from scholars, whose work has built a developed literature,
resulting in a thorough and comprehensive theoretical framework for analysis. From there, the
study employs the use of statistical and historical references to build an argument to explain why
there were and continue to be so few women in the representative bodies of Estonia and Poland.
In order to understand the appearance of women and the views of society of women in
the upper echelons of power, this study makes extensive use of previous surveys that have been
completed in the two countries, either by their governments or by outside NGOs. The analysis of
governmental legislation and governmental programs is also employed in this work, such as the
legislation on gender equality adopted in the 21 st century in Poland and Estonia. The statistical
analysis was completed by using online analysis tools through Inglehart’s World Values Survey
or by citing statistical data from published surveys and polls. Through the statistical data, a more
complete picture is formed on the potential changes in attitudes and beliefs of not only women,
but the whole society through transition and post-transition in the examined countries.
In an attempt to gather information on the contemporary mindset of female
parliamentarians from Estonia and Poland, a standardized survey was sent electronically to each
member, of which thirteen Estonian and seventeen Polish women responded. My survey was
meant to discover the prevailing attitudes of current female parliamentarians in regards to issues
brought up in the literature, such as the continuation of the double burden, expectations of
women in each society, and the rejection of feminism. The current female members of the Polish
Sejm and Senate and Estonian Riigikogu were chosen as respondents, as they are the population
this thesis seeks to analyze. The survey was conducted through an online survey generator and
consisted of thirteen questions. The first set of questions aimed at obtaining basic information,
such as whether the parliamentarian was married, had children, and possessed higher education
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beyond secondary school. The first set of questions sought information in regards to the
women’s adherence to the perceived gender roles in each country to determine whether the
respondents fit the expected profile of a married woman with children in each country.
Additionally, a question about political affiliation was asked to obtain information on the
parliamentarian’s identity and where the majority of female parliamentarians lie on the political
spectrum, as the respondents were told that they could remain anonymous.
Furthermore, to explore what led the respondents into a career of politics, questions were
asked as to how long one had been in politics, had one always wanted to be a politician, and
what led one to choose the path of politics. These questions were posed in an attempt to
determine whether there was a recurring trend in regards to a female parliamentarian’s choice for
her participation in politics. Additionally, the questions sought to obtain further information as to
why the women chose politics, as it is a traditionally male occupied sector of society.
The remaining questions of the survey were created to gauge the importance and
acceptance of gender equality within the parliaments of Estonia and Poland. The respondents
were asked if they considered themselves a feminist, as much of the scholarly literature suggests
negative connotations associated with the term in East-Central Europe. The survey sought to
gauge contemporary attitudes towards feminism, although from a minimal proportion of women
in the overall population. Moreover, the respondents were asked if they believed female
politicians are accepted as leaders in their country, whether women’s issues were heard by men
in the legislative process, and if the respondent had found it difficult, as a woman, to be engaged
in politics in their country. Optional answers were provided on a multiple choice scale, starting
with a wholly positive and ending with a wholly negative response to the question, with
variations situated between the two extremes.
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This study wishes to show that although previous arguments of women’s apathy and the
weakness of women’s movements have worked to explain specific aspects of the transition and
post-transition periods, they do not account for the overall phenomenon of unequal participation
of women in the parliament of post-communist states. By examining the different situations,
beliefs, and legislation in a post-Soviet republic such as Estonia and a post-communist Central
European state like Poland, the thesis attempts to develop a useful and meaningful comparison of
the post-communist states, leading to the same result: relatively low numbers of female
parliamentarians.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ESTONIAN CASE STUDY

3.1 Historical Background
The Republic of Estonia, reestablished in 1991, is a state with a population of 1.3 million
inhabitants that lies in the northeastern part of Europe.75 The Estonians possess a distinct culture,
language, and history within the context of Eastern Europe and its post-communist neighbors.
Estonians often identify more with the Nordic and the Scandinavian countries, especially their
Finnish neighbors to the north, with whom they share a related language. 76 However, Estonia
shares much of its recent history with the former Soviet Union. Estonia experienced a
tumultuous history laced with occupation and integration into great empires. The most recent,
and perhaps most painful, imperial experience was the second Soviet “occupation” that Estonia
endured from 1944-1991. Kevin O’Connor aptly describes the historical experience of Estonia
and the other Baltic states, “In light of this seemingly unending series of catastrophes, it is a
wonder that the three Baltic countries exist at all and that the cultures and traditions of their
peoples have managed to survive at all.” 77 The endurance of the Baltic peoples throughout
numerous occupations is venerable, and the success of Estonia throughout the transition to
democracy and capitalism is admirable.
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The development of Estonian nationalism in the 19 th century began “on the cultural level
and later evolv[ed] into a movement that sought political rights for Estonians.” 78 Helen Biin and
Anneli Albi note, “The issues of female suffrage arose in the context of, and was deeply
interconnected with, the nationalist movement and the fight for the country’s independence; the
events that paved the way to universal suffrage traced back to the middle of the 19 th century.”79
The emergence of a nationalist movement allowed for women to express their want of suffrage
and rights, but it placed Estonian women and their rights within the context of the greater notion
of Estonian independence and nationalism and the role of women within it. Rather than
independently occurring within Estonian society, the women’s movement was seen as a “byproduct” of the Estonian national movement, therefore it came as no surprise that the women’s
movement was overlooked by prevailing nationalistic attitudes in the early 20th century. 80
The women’s clubs that did develop after the Revolution of 1905 in the Russian Empire,
mainly in the cities of Tallinn and Tartu, mainly discussed national issues in conversations, with
the gaining of political rights and civil rights for all Estonians and not specifically women being
a priority for the clubs at the time. 81 Though these women who were engaged in women’s clubs
and groups, they were not seeking radical feminist ideas or concepts, but were simply seeking
Estonian independence from the Russian Empire. Biin and Albi note further, “After 1906,
however, debates on women’s suffrage subsided and debates on women’s rights concentrated on
other issues, such as women’s right to work and access to universities.” 82 Despite this, opponents
of women’s suffrage and political involvement at the time were cited as believing, “Allowing
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women to enter politics was seen as tantamount to a national tragedy, since raising children and
taking care of the ‘national soul’ was perceived as women’s ultimate duty.” 83 Though women
were fighting for overall Estonian independence, they were still viewed within the traditional
roles of Estonian society, as caretakers of the nation rather than creators of it.
The February Revolution of 1917in the Russian Empire had further influence in the
political awakening of Estonian society, including women who sought political rights.84 Within
the increasingly politically conscious Estonian society, “politics became a topic of daily
conversation and a passion for many women, raising hopes that women would finally be granted
political rights despite the rather strong opposition of some leading male politicians.” 85 Women
in the Russian Empire, still including Estonia in 1917, gained the right to vote in 1917 with the
Autonomy Act of the Provisional Government, which granted universal suffrage to all
inhabitants within the borders of the Russian Empire.86
Biin and Albi noted,
“Women in Estonia had their first experience of voting and running for office
during the local elections in March and June 1917, in which 13 women gained
access to rural government councils. They were also allowed to vote and run in
the elections of the Provisional Assembly of Estonia (Maapäev) in July 1917. One
female candidate was elected to office; she was later followed by another female
politician as an alternate member of the Provisional Assembly.” 87
Though these elections did not yield great results for women and they did not denote much in
regards to posterity of the government, they were of great importance as they were the first
elections that Estonian women could take part in and become representatives.
Estonia experienced its first period of independence during the inter-war years, gaining
independence after the Great War ended in 1918. Freed from the Russian Empire and Soviet
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Russia, Estonians created a state built on Western ideals, taking the Weimar Constitution as a
model when creating the Estonian republic. Women under the first Estonian republic gained
numerous rights without having to organize to demand these rights, including the right to vote in
1918.88 Estonian women gained the right to vote before their counterparts in many Western
countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. 89 Despite gaining the right to
vote, women in interwar Estonia did not possess equal representation with their male
counterparts in the institutions of government.90
Since Estonia became an independent country in the era of nationalism and conflicts
between the Great Powers, gender issues were not the primary concern of the fledgling state, but
were “subordinate to national and class concerns [and] no women’s movement of any
consequence existed to advance the cause of gender equality.” 91 The separation of gender roles
and the lack of concern for gender equality though certainly not unique, provide a backdrop to
the history of gender relations in modern-day Estonia. The lack of importance that has been
given to gender equality in Estonian society, as with many countries, is a recurring theme in the
small country’s history.
O’Connor points out that the position of women in Estonian history has been one of
caring for the men and the rearing of children. Rather than possessing a firm interest in matters in
the public realm, Estonian women were placed within the home in Estonian society. According
to O’Connor, the view of women as caretakers that was prominent in peasant society laid a
foundation for the gender relations that continue into 20 th century Estonian society. This point in
O’Connor’s argument, pointing to the role of women in Estonian society in the late 19 th-early
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20th centuries, is much more relevant to modern Estonia, instead of the emphasis on a prevalent
peasant culture. There is still a segregation of labor within Estonia, with women confined to the
service sector and men in the more powerful public sector, which is reflected in contemporary
society, whereas a peasant society is no longer relevant.
Furthermore, the relative lack of religiosity in Estonia, as compared to Poland for
example, has given Estonia the reputation of one of Europe’s most secular countries. 92 The weak
state of organized religion in Estonia hindered the emergence of a religious foundation for
gender relations and gender roles in Estonian society. As noted above, traditional roles prevail in
Estonia without reference to Christianity to influence the view of women, in effect leaving the
argument of the importance of religion for culturally determined gender relations invalid and
unsupported in this particular case. Interestingly, however, as O’Connor notes, women in these
traditional cultures of the Baltic states have been viewed favorably as goddesses, possessing
respectability and honor. Women, therefore, in the traditional cultures, were “transmitters of
Baltic cultures.”93 Therefore, though women were confined to domesticity, traditionally they
were not viewed with disrespect. However, with the modernization of society, traditional gender
relations prevented women from equally participating in public life.
This follows Connell’s idea that though women are not mistreated, it does not necessarily
mean that they are not subordinated within society. A hegemonic masculinity can be identified
throughout Estonia’s history. From the separation of gender roles in O’Connor’s identified
peasant culture to the importance of women in Estonian culture as imparting culture and values
to future generations, a separate masculinity and femininity emerges. Historically in Estonian
society, women have been confined to the private and seemingly less powerful sector of society,
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while men have exerted their hegemony within the public realm, through nationalist discourse or
community leadership. Though Estonia has experienced numerous changes since the
establishment of its first independent republic in 1918, the domination of men in the public and
political realm and the reign of hegemonic masculinity, though certainly transformed since its
conception, continue to this day.

3.2 Estonian Women under Soviet Rule

Estonia became a republic of the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of another conflict
between great powers. The results of the conflict led to the surrender of Estonia’s independence
in exchange for enforced Soviet rule, which was followed by the German invasion of 1941, but
was restored in 1944. With Soviet rule, however, came Soviet ideology, including the
contradictory ideas and practices on gender equality. As noted above, women were exposed to a
double burden under communism, leaving little time and space for political activity. Helemäe
and Saar point out, “Soviet norms and institutions rested on the premise that women, but not
men, had dual roles; thus legislation favored a traditional division of gender roles; for example,
childcare leaves were only available for mothers.”94 The continuation of the segregated gender
roles prevented the placement of women in the upper echelons of power in the Estonian Soviet
Socialist Republic.
The absence of women in Soviet political institutions was noted by Gail Lapidus in her
1978 work Women in Soviet Society, and yet her statement still holds true, “Despite considerable
efforts to integrate women more fully into political life and some success in drawing women into
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political careers, in the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, women are largely absent from the upper
reaches of power. In substantive rather than ceremonial roles, in the key hierarchies of political
and coercive power, and at the apex of the system as a whole, politics remains a male affair.” 95
As Estonia was a part of the Soviet Union, few women, if any, ever participated in the upper
ranks of the republic’s central committee.
Despite the lack of women in the higher institutions of Soviet power, women did grace
the ranks of party leadership, though they were put into stereotypical roles, such as the head of
the Party Central Women’s Department, which was reserved for a woman to head it. This
position “accounted for one of the four women to hold a leadership position in Estonia between
1956 and 1973.”96 Perhaps even more interesting is that women in Estonia possessed an average
level of education higher than their male comrades, yet were virtually absent from the decisionmaking body of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. 97 Despite the higher educational levels
of Estonian women, often the highest in the Soviet Union, Gail Lapidus notes further, “Estonia
and Lithuania, for example, have had only half as many women in positions of leadership at the
republic level as Latvia, while the largest numbers of women are found in some of the Central
Asian republics, where the promotion of women to high level positions within the Party and
government has received great attention.”98
Although women were present in the local soviets and as deputies to the Supreme Soviet
with the help of gender quotas, they held little actual power. The argument could be made that no
one held real power in the local soviets or the Supreme Soviet, but the unequal participation of
women in the republic and union soviets was quite alarming, considering the egalitarian
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promises of Soviet ideology. Anu Laas expands further on the quotas for women by saying,
“Since Soviet-era quotas were further complicated by issues of class, patronage and
manipulations of the Communist Party, their effectiveness as mechanisms of inclusion and
equality was completely discredited.”99 The inefficiency of the Soviet government, false
promises of gender equality, and the seemingly useless nature of even having representatives in
Soviet institutions left many women, as well as men, disillusioned and uninterested in the
workings of government. The underrepresentation of women, regardless of their education, is a
conundrum that exists to this day in the Riigikogu, leaving one to consider the cultural
foundations of the gender relations in Estonia and their persistence through the years.

3.3 Estonian Women in Transition, 1989-2004

Piotr Sztompka made an eloquent observation on the importance of the year 1989, and
therefore, it is fruitful to quote him at length:
The year 1989 was not only a political break from an autocratic, mono-party
regime toward a parliamentary, multiparty system—the ultimate victory of
democracy; nor was it an economic break from a socialist, planned, command
economy, to a basically free, capitalist market—the second birth of capitalism.
Neither was it the radical transformation of institutions, or the restitution of some
earlier social order—‘the return’ to Europe, to the West, to ‘normality’ or
whatever. Rather, it started the reconstruction of a new social order from a strange
mixture of components of various origins. It was a major culture and civilizational
break, a beginning of the reconstruction of the deepest cultural tissue as well as
civilizational surface of society, the slow emergence of the new post-Communist
culture and civilization.100
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The “reconstruction” that Sztompka describes was quite evident in Estonia during the transition.
Sztompka argues that a new civilization emerged following the break with communism. Shirley
A. Woods adds, “Unlike other Soviet republics, Estonia did have a pre-Soviet civic culture from
which to draw experience of political pluralism.” 101 The break was certainly felt in Estonia, but
often with a renewed emphasis on the traditional gender roles and an increasingly male presence
in the representative bodies and government that had characterized Estonian society throughout
its pre-Soviet history.
The fall of communism following the heralded Singing Revolution in Estonia left the
country to confront the implementation of a representative democracy and free markets without
the aid of its eastern neighbor. The uniqueness of the Estonian case during the transition has been
explained in the following terms: ‘In Estonia, the Soviet doctrine never reached the position of
ideological hegemony…Double-think and double-behavior was widespread because of the
occupation, and because of the strong ties to pre-World War II society and to the Western world
at large.” 102 Additionally, Marju Lauristin suggests that “Westernization (in the case of CentralEuropean and Baltic countries it is really re-Westernization) is the most important systemic
aspect in the transition process.”103 Estonia sought the acceptance and aid of its newly supportive
Western neighbors, which allowed the country to refer back to its first period of independence in
the interwar years for inspiration. Nevertheless, the turn to the West was neither easy nor
painless for the Estonians.

101

Shirley A.Woods, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Contemporary Estonia,” in Christopher Williams and Thanasis
D. Sfikas, eds. Ethnicity and Nationalism in Russia, the CIS and the Baltic States (Brookfield, USA: Ashgate
Publishing Company, 1999), 276.
102
Peeter Vihalemm, Marju Lauristin, and Ivar Tallo, “Development of Political Culture in Estonia,” in Marju
Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm, eds., Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the
Estonian Post-Communist Transition, (Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press, 1997), 199.
103
Lauristin, 31.

47

Estonian transition began in 1990, and was met with many difficulties.104 However,
despite the economic difficulties, “Estonia took a very liberal approach, with few barriers to
labor market dislocations or new job creation, meager support of the unemployed, and no
effective wage floor.”105 The liberal approach for the Estonians met with ‘considerable success’
in the ‘politics of democracy,’ leaving Estonia as an admirable example of democratic transition
after the early years. 106 Despite the liberal approaches taken by the Estonian government, the
reforms affected the women’s situation more than their male counterparts. Although women are
guaranteed equal rights in the Estonian constitution, “women have seen only marginal
improvement in their situation; in some respects, the condition has actually worsened since the
Soviet collapse.”107 Much of the literature written on Estonia and its women deals with the labor
force and economic position of women compared to their male counterparts. Women’s
unemployment at the time of transition and throughout the 1990s exceeded that of men, with an
average 38.3 percent of women and 24.7 percent of men facing unemployment throughout the
decade.
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Women also made significantly less in terms of wages and salaries than Estonian

men, a phenomenon that continues to this day. 109
The liberal economic approach to the transition paid off for the Estonians in the long run,
but the transition period saw the women’s movement focusing on problems concerning violence
in the Soviet army until its evacuation, alternative education, reproductive health, home
economics, and setting up a business, rather than the inherent gender inequality that became
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more pronounced with the collapse of communism. 110 Although women’s organizations and
associations were able to voice their opinions and thoughts after Gorbachev’s policies of
glasnost and perestroika, the women’s movement at the time of transition focused on helping
women in traditional female roles, rather than attempting to embrace gender equality through
female political activism, equal wages, and better female representation in the Riigikogu.
The legacy of unequal representation carried on into the reestablished Estonian state. The
lack of a feminist agenda or focus on gender equality in Estonia at the time of the transition can
be attributed to the lack of interest in feminism or in the type of gender equality that the Soviet
Union and ideology supposedly represented. Although the goal of gender equality was present
in Soviet propaganda, it was not enforced in practice, despite the use of gender quotas. If
anything, the Soviet Union further promoted the continuation of rigid gender roles by allowing
specifically Estonian conservative beliefs to prevail in contradiction to proclaimed Soviet
policies, preventing gender equality and women from exercising real political power. Raili
Marling writes in her discourse analysis of Estonian print media, “…Estonia had a back-lash
against feminism before it developed a viable feminism.” 111 Marling continues, “…the dominant
discourse created a “spectre of feminism” it battled with and banished, for the sake of the
“progress” of the nation, a context where feminism became a scapegoat for various social ills and
a means for distracting attention from deep-seated gendered inequalities in the society, but
possibly, also other social concerns.” 112 Feminism, therefore, was used as a distraction rather
than a solution, as Marling notes.
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Furthermore, the discussion and discourse on gender equality and feminism was often
confined to academic halls and journals, rather than through promotion of public discourse
generally accessible to all Estonians. 113 The weak middle class, the contradictions between
Soviet ideology and practice, the difficult economic transition, the absence of a public discussion
of feminist solutions, and the return of nationalism and traditional norms left the women of
Estonia out of political office and institutions in the newly democratic state of Estonia.
Additionally, as seen with the first Republic of Estonia in 1918, nation and state building took
precedence throughout the public discourse, which often left the continual disparity of the
equality between genders in powerful positions on the periphery. These forces culminated in the
success of a hegemonic masculinity, preventing the realization of greater gender equality at the
time of transition.
The drastic decline in women in national parliaments at the time of transition led many to
speculate about the true causes of gender inequality that existed in the post-communist countries,
including Estonia. The number of women in representative bodies in Estonia experienced a
drastic decline from around 30 percent in the late 1980s to around 12 percent in the first free
parliamentary elections that occurred in 1992.114 The percentage of women in the Riigikogu
remained around 12 percent, experiencing no fluctuation in the two elections that took place
between 1992 and 1995.115 The disappearance of gender quotas for the representative bodies as
well as rejection of the façade of gender equality triumphed by Soviet ideology led to bleak
results and outlooks for women’s representation, the addressing of women’s issues at a national
level, and the development of a successful women’s movement in post-communist Estonia.
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Moreover, in the elections for president, only one woman, Lagle Parek, the first Minister
of the Interior, was a candidate in the first elections. Parek received four percent of the national
vote in September 1992, failing to continue on to the second round, where Lennart Mari
prevailed.116 Despite Parek’s loss, she was an important politician at the time of transition in
Estonia. Parek was a founding member of the Estonian National Independence Party in 1988 and
was the Minister of the Interior in 1992-1993. She went on to continue her stay in the Riigikogu
by becoming a part of the merged Pro Patria and Res Publica Union Party (Isamaa ja Respublica
Liit), a right-leaning political party that currently holds seats in the Riigikogu. Despite Parek’s
presence in Estonian politics during the transition and post-transition, she interestingly converted
to Catholicism and resides in a convent, away from politics and the public eye. Though Parek
was an example of a strong and seemingly powerful woman in the Estonian government, she
harbored conservative leanings and maintained her conservative ideals throughout the transition
and post-transition periods.
Furthermore, Estonia has yet to seriously consider a woman for the president, a
ceremonial, though important post in the Estonian government.117 The campaign of Siiri Oviir, a
woman who had once occupied the position of mayor and Minister of Social Affairs118 in the
government, for president of Estonian in was hopeful and seen as a “breath of fresh air on the
local political scene.”119 Although Oviir was seen as a hopeful in the presidential election in the
1996 elections, Raili Põldsaar noted in a 2002 article, “However, before the presidential race
proper could even start, Oviir was ousted from the race by her own party which, without any
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qualms, replaced her with a political lightweight whose chances at winning were significantly
lesser.”120 Põldsaar continues, “A woman who seemed poised to disprove the vision of Estonian
politics as a male-dominated domain was still proved to be a figurine in a political game the aims
of which are unclear.”121 Unable to pass the barrier to the presidential elections, Oviir continued
on in politics by becoming an Estonian delegate in the European Parliament.
Moreover, a woman has never held the more powerful position of Prime Minister or post
of county elder during the transition period, and still has not held either position. 122 The World
Values Survey results from 1996 indicated that 28.7 percent of those surveyed agreed strongly
and 40.5 percent agreed that men make better political leaders than women do, indicating a lack
of support for women in positions of power in Estonia. 123 These views were certainly reflected in
the low numbers of women in leadership positions in the Estonian government at the time.
Though women are able, and have been able since the Gorbachev era, to participate in public
life, the progress necessary for the equality of women’s voices during the transition period was
minimal, and women were continuously underrepresented in the Riigikogu. Only in the latter half
of the 1990s and early 2000s did public acknowledgment and a discourse develop on the inherent
gender inequality present in the institutions of power in Estonia.
More recently, women have had better representation than the dismally low percentages
of women in the Riigikogu seen during the transition, but women still make up less than a quarter
of representatives in the Riigikogu and even fewer women are seen at a ministerial level, let
alone the presidency or Prime Minister. Despite the rise of Ene Ergma to president of the
Riigikogu in 2003, women are still mostly absent from the upper echelons of governmental
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power. Ene Ergma has proven to be an important politician in Estonia, occupying the position of
the President of the Parliament from 2003-2006. Additionally, she was reelected to the position
in 2007, and continues to occupy the post.124 Ergma, like Lagle Parek mentioned above, belongs
to the Pro Patria and Res Publica party, a party that in connected with liberal conservatism.
Again, like Parek, Ergma ran for the office of president in the 2006 presidential elections, but
like her female predecessors, she failed to pass the first round of voting.125 Ergma can be seen as
a persistent challenge to the notion of Estonian hegemonic masculinity, not by her voiced
resistance to the prevailing hegemonic masculinity, but by her continual presence and election to
the high post within the parliament.
Throughout the period from transition to today, women in the Riigikogu, and women as a
whole in Estonia, have attained higher levels of education than their male counterparts, yet
continue to comprise of only a minority of the positions in the government and the Riigikogu.
The transition period saw the stagnant level of women at 12 percent in the Riigikogu. Since then,
the percent of women in the national parliament has risen and reached as high as 24 percent, but
the number of women in ministerial positions continues to remain at low levels.
From 1995, when women made up only 12 percent of the 101 representatives in the
Estonian Riigikogu, to the current make-up of the representative body, where women make up
around 19 percent of the body, progress has been made. 126 An additional five females were
elected to the Riigikogu in the 1999 elections, producing a 5 percent gain for women. That spike,
however, has not been repeated in the elections since 1999, producing a percentage that hovers
around 20 percent.
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3.4 Estonian Women after Transition, 2004-2012
The transition period came to a fruitful end for Estonia in 2004 with its admission into the
European Union and NATO, thus fully integrating the republic into the international community.
The Republic of Estonia also passed a Gender Equality Act on April 7, 2004, which entered
force in May of the same year. The Act was passed within weeks of Estonia’s accession to the
EU. Moreover, the proportion of female representatives in the Riigikogu remained around 18
percent in the 2003 elections and grew to almost 24 percent in the 2007 elections. 127
The relative stabilization and increase of the percentage of women in the Riigikogu noted
above cannot be seen in the proportion of women in ministerial positions. In 2005 Estonia could
boast of having women make up 15 percent of its senior minister positions, yet in 2009, the
percentage had been lowered to only eight percent.128 Overall, the average percentage of women
parliamentarians and ministers in Estonia from 1999-2004 was 22 percent.129 Although the
percentage of women in the Riigikogu has risen, it is still below the levels seen under
communism, as well as the European average of 25.76 percent as of 2012.130
Despite the rise in the number of female parliamentary representatives, Liina Järviste, in
her policy analysis of gender equality in Estonia, after reviewing the Gender Equality Monitoring
survey conducted in 2009, writes “Nearly half of the people believe that the position of men in
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Estonian society is somewhat or significantly better than the position of women.” 131 Järviste
continues, “Gender inequality is quite common in Estonian society, despite the fact that equality
is guaranteed by law. Evidence to that effect can be found in gender wage gap, higher level of
poverty among women, and shorter lifespan of men.”132 In fact, Estonia possesses the highest
gender wage gap, a staggering difference of about 30 percent, in the European Union. 133
Jaarviste emphasizes, however, that “the wage gap is not a result of different wages paid to
women and men in equivalent positions in the same organization,” but is a result of a gendered
labor force.134 Women and men occupy separate sectors within the labor force, with women
making much less than men in their respective occupations. The gender pay gap, however, was
recognized as a problem by the Estonian government, and in September 2011 action was begun
to reduce the alarming pay gap in the country. 135
Interestingly, however, Jaarviste notes that “gender equality is not a ‘female thing”; it
concerns men as well and is necessary for the entire society. 136 Therefore, the policy analysis
focused on both angles of gender inequality, calling for a comprehensive reexamination of the
issue in Estonia. Järviste also notes a difference in responses to survey questions when posed to
other ethnic groups, mainly Russians, in Estonia. Their responses showed a more conservative
view on gender equality than the ethnic Estonians, adding a significant factor in shaping
Estonia’s overall results in the 2009 survey. 137 The large Russian minority in Estonia will
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certainly have to be involved in the public discourse on gender equality in order for that part of
the population to accommodate the increasing notions of gender equality in Estonia.
My survey of thirteen of the twenty-two current female parliamentarians in the Riigikogu
yielded a valuable insight into the thoughts of those women currently sitting in the unicameral
legislative body of the Estonian government. Thirteen questions were posed and thirteen
parliamentarians in the Riigikogu anonymously responded to the survey.

Though seven

respondents are married serving in the Riigikogu, there was a significant minority of five women
who are not married.138 Seven respondents indicated that they are married and ten of the women
have children, implying that these women are responsible for both their household tasks and
careers. The division of household tasks in an Estonian family, notably, has not changed to any
degree, leaving women parliamentarians largely responsible for the housework .139 Additionally,
although these women are still responsible for the majority of household work, on average they
still possess a higher level of education than their male counterparts in the parliament. 140
The respondents came from all four parties present in the Riigikogu: The Social
Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond), Pro Patria and Res Publica Union Group
(Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit), the Estonian Reform Party (Eesti Reformerakond), and the
Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskarakond). Additionally, seven of the respondents had been in
the Riigikogu for four or more terms, suggesting the women had developed a reputation for
effective service as legislators by continuously being reelected. Surprisingly, only one
respondent entered the parliament as a new member in the last elections in 2011.
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Only five of the women surveyed had always wanted to be in politics, with the majority
noting that they had not planned to be politicians, but circumstances had allowed them to pursue
that career track. Laas notes, “Women fear being labeled, being caught in the “media fire” or
giving “wrong” answers in public debates.”141 The fear of exposure in the public realm can cause
apprehension for women who may otherwise seek political office to promote change. Moreover,
seven women responded that they have found being a woman in politics somewhat difficult, with
four replying that they had not found it difficult.
Participation in politics in Estonia has not been generally popular in recent years. Anu
Laas continues,
Participation in political parties is also low; in 2002, it did not exceed four percent
of the total population. Survey data show that active participation in politics is
still low, but interest in politics has slightly increased. According to Estonian data
from the European Social Survey (2004, Round II) only 2.5 percent say that they
are members of a political party, and 51 percent voted in last elections. In 2004,
36 percent said that they were interested or very interested in politics. 142
The lack of interest in politics shown by Estonians as a whole can contribute to the lack of
female candidates and representatives. Helen Biin, in her work on the influence of political
parties on women’s representation in the Riigikogu, found “that women are neither highly
motivated nor confident enough to aspire for higher office. The lack of confidence and
motivation among female politicians was repeatedly highlighted in interviews.”143 The lack of
confidence may be attributed to the lack of support for women’s political participation in public
opinion, since the public realm is traditionally viewed as a masculine area of dominance.
Additionally, being put on the top or towards the top of the list makes a great difference
in the outcome of an election for women. Laas notes, “According to surveys on participation in
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politics, the open list feature of the Estonian electoral system implies that only women who are
among the first ten or 20 candidates on a list are likely to be elected.”144 Therefore, it is
imperative that women be placed on the upper part of the lists, which are often decided by men.
The idea of women as leaders in Estonia is also a contested area. The majority of the
women representatives in the Riigikogu who were polled responded that they felt as though
women are somewhat but not fully accepted as political leaders in Estonia. The lack of broad
public acceptance of women as political leaders prevents more women from gaining seats in the
Riigikogu. Moreover, when asked, the respondents to the survey answered that although women
are present in the parliament women’s issues are only sometimes heard or not heard as often as
they should be by the men in the government. This lack of support by men in addressing
women’s issues, Laas point out, leads to the result that “even women who are highly respected
tend not to speak out on women’s issues.” 145 The women who are present in the Riigikogu are
seemingly limited in their attempts to enact change through present institutions and norms,
resulting in little change or transformation in women’s issues or gender inequality.
Nine of the women surveyed believe that gender inequality is a problem in Estonia, with
only two respondents believing it was a major problem in Estonia. Most noted that other areas
such as the economy take precedence, while four replied that gender equality was not an issue in
Estonia. This statistic among the female parliamentarians is reflected in Järviste’s policy analysis
when she writes, “For instance, only 6 percent of Estonian residents believe that gender
inequality is a serious social problem (Kaha 2009). There is a widespread belief that the past
inequality has been abolished: women and men are equal before the law and women can be seen
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in active roles in various areas of social life, incl[uding] among decision-makers.”146 The popular
belief that past inequality has been abolished does not aid in the development of gender equality
throughout Estonia. Put simply, most Estonians are seemingly not interested in gender
equality. 147 However, Järviste notes an improvement, stating, “The main conclusion is that the
level of awareness of gender inequality and the need for equality is not high, but has increased
somewhat in comparison to 2005. Women are more aware of gender inequality and have also
had more experiences with inequality. In addition, women expressed greater support for
equality.”148 By gaining the support of women, though slowly and gradually, a glimmering hope
of further awareness of gender inequality and the need for change exists in Estonia.
The negative connotations of feminism, despite the transition years and further
integration with the West, continue in Estonia. When asked if they would consider themselves a
feminist, nine of the polled parliamentarians responded in the negative, with only three noting
that they would consider themselves one. Interestingly, a divergence with the anti-Soviet
ideology which guided the transition appears when eleven of the respondents believe that gender
quotas are a good idea, with eight responding that they fully approve the implementation of
gender quotas. Women who are active at the national level and are active party members tend to
be more supportive of the idea of reintroducing quotas than women who are active at the local
level or those who are involved in women’s organizations. 149
However, overall, gender quotas are often opposed in Estonia despite the implementation
of quotas throughout the EU. Opponents argue that quotas are an extreme measure, that there are
not enough competent women to fulfill the quotas, quotas humiliate the women included in them,

146

Järviste, 4.
Alas and Kaarelson, 18.
148
Jarviste, 2.
149
Laas, 107.
147

59

and most interesting, “Women themselves are not interested in [having] a position with
responsibilities.”150 To combat these arguments, the Estonian government has implemented a
program, “Promotion of Gender Equality, 2011-2013,” in an attempt to promote gender
mainstreaming in governmental policies and to promote overall gender equality in Estonia.
Opinions such as those above, though they may be the minority opinion, will be difficult to
combat.151 The arguments against gender quotas are quite interesting, as Estonia often identifies
with the Nordic nations, where gender quotas are commonplace and have been successful in
creating greater equality in governmental bodies, but Estonia continues to lack quotas for
political representation.
An example of the continual downplay of the importance of women in higher positions
within Estonian society and media is witnessed with Kadri Simson. An example of the scrutiny
that can be witnessed in Estonian media in regards to female parliamentarians is seen with the
relatively young and very attractive Kadri Simson. Simson is a currently a member of the
Riigikogu and is the vice chairman of the Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond). The Centre
Party is headed by the much talked about political figure, Edgar Savisaar, who is often
mentioned as the authoritarian leader of the party. 152 Additionally, the Centre Parry is quite
popular among the ethnic Russian part of the Estonian population, allowing Simson to garner
support from both ethnic parts of the population. Simson sits on the Foreign Affairs Committee
in the Riigikogu and she is also the chair of the Estonian-US parliamentary group. Simson, a
representative in the Riigikogu since 2007, has been a member of the Centre Party since 1995
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and has been labeled in the past as the Crown Princess of the Centre Party by Postimees, the
widely circulated Estonian newspaper. 153 Though she is perceived this way, Simson appears as a
modern woman, with an active blog where she writes on current events, and has a Twitter
account where she tweets current headlines and includes her fellow politicians in the tweets.
Unlike Ene Ergma and Lagle Parek, Simson represents the model of the new Estonian woman,
young, attractive, and present in the media.
Her coverage in the media is somewhat sensational, with titles such as the Crown
Princess of the Centre Party and speculations of a possible end to her marriage to the Estonian
journalist, Priit Simson. 154 Additionally, articles are written in the tabloids titled, “Kadri Simson
explains why she said no to having children.” 155 Such material shows that though the information
is sensationalist; it is a topic of public discourse.

Rather than Simson’s work as a

parliamentarian and politician, Simson is often scrutinized for not conforming to the Estonian
standards of a woman or reinforcing the hegemonic femininity, that of being a nurturing and
caring mother.
Moreover, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), in a report on gender equality in Estonia from 2005, noted,
The reasons for the widespread inequality mostly lie in traditional gender roles
and stereotypic belief that women and men have preconditions and skills that are
inborn and not acquired. The gender-prejudiced environment favours the
persistence of discriminating attitudes and primarily restricts women’s
participating in social, economic and political life. It can be said that there is still
resistance in society to improving the social representation of women through
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gender quotas, and such resistance can be seen among the political elite, as well as
in the public opinion among women’s organizations themselves. 156
Despite prevailing traditionalist views among many Estonians, the integration of Estonia into
international organizations as well as its admission to the European Union has had a great impact
on the country’s gender equality policies. By adopting the acquis associated with admission to
the European Union, Estonia had to adopt updated gender equality laws to reflect the European
Union’s goal of gender equality. Estonia did not adopt the Gender Equality Act, an act that had
been debated for years, until 2004.157 Under Article 2, the Act also created two new institutions,
the Gender Equality Commissioner and the Gender Equality Council, to monitor compliance to
the law.158 The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender and encourages gender
equality to be promoted in public places.
Furthermore, Anu Laas describes the changing views of women who had become
involved in international NGOs and organizations, noting:
From 2001–2004, women’s NGOs garnered more knowledge of equal
opportunities and women’s rights. The women’s movement became more
interested in politics than it had been in the 1990s. Women signed a shadow
report presented to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In autumn 2002, 60
Estonian women’s NGOs signed a letter of support for the Gender Equality
Bill. 159
The involvement of women’s NGOs and a commitment to gender equality in the 2000s provides
hope for Estonian women in achieving equality not only under the law, which has been
guaranteed, but also within society.
With accession to the EU in 2004 as well as the adoption of the necessary laws, came the
opportunity to send representatives to the European Parliament. As of 2012, three of the six
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members of Estonia’s delegation to the EP are women, Siiri Oviir, Kristiina Ojuland, and Vilja
Savisaar-Toomast.160 Though Estonia only sends six representatives, it places Estonia among the
more progressive states in the European Union in this sense. However, the equality represented
in Estonia’s European Parliamentary delegation may speak to the seemingly less pressing matters
of the EU compared to those discussed in the Riigikogu; thus the receptivity to women in this
position.
The career of Siiri Oviir is worth returning to and highlighting as it is quite notable in the
Estonian case. She currently is a MEP in the European Parliament and serves on the Committee
on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality. 161 She is one of the few Estonian female
parliamentarians to openly fight for women’s rights and gender equality, and she possesses and
impressive resume in regards to involvement in women’s issues and public discourse on gender
equality. Oviir was a refounding member of the Estonian Womens’ Union from 1998-1996 and
she has been the chairwoman of the Estonian Womens’ Union since 1996. Additionally, she is a
member of the Zonta International Womens’ Club in Tallinn and has been a member of the
Womens’ Section in the Estonian Centre Party since 1991. She served as a member in the
Riigikogu from 1992-2004, even occupying the position of the Deputy Speaker of the Estonian
Parliament from 1999-2001. 162
Though Estonia certainly has women of note in the upper reaches of power within the
state, the women do not possess extreme views or necessarily generate a lot of attention in the
media in regards to gender equality, as will be seen in the Polish case study. Estonian politics
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often rests in the center of the political spectrum, with very few extreme outliers. 163 The centrist
leaning of the government is reflected in the women that occupy the Riigikogu, as although they
challenge the concept of hegemonic masculinity, they make few waves in overhauling the
concept. Despite the continued scrutiny of women in the public eye in Estonia as seen in the case
of Kadri Simson, gender equality in Estonia is on its way to being incorporated into public
discourse through government initiatives. Partial credit of these initiatives is attributed to the
influence of international organizations, such as the EU, which has begun to affect gender
relations in Estonia, allowing for more discussion and consideration. With the continuation of
such discourse and interaction with international organizations, women in Estonia may begin to
experience greater income equality, more serious representation in the media, and equal political
representation in the coming decades.
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CHAPTER 4
THE POLISH CASE STUDY

4.1 Historical Background
Poland, a country situated in the heart of Europe, had an equally tumultuous history
throughout the twentieth century. Poland has a population around 38 million and consists of
about 98 percent ethnic Poles. The homogeneity of the Polish nation makes possible a unique
analysis of Polish culture and norms in regards to gender inequality. Poland did not become a
modern sovereign nation-state until 1918 with the end of World War I, but had thrived as a
cultural nation for centuries. Women gained the right to vote, alongside men, in 1918, including
‘the right to choose and to be chosen.’ 164
An active women’s movement was present before the independence of Poland was
declared in 1918. The women’s movement, like in Estonia, eventually coincided and was
superseded by the nationalist movement in Poland. The women of Poland, however, faced
different circumstances throughout the development and maintenance of Polish nationalism
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, as Poland was partitioned among three empires, thus
splitting up the Polish population. Early 20th century Poland experienced a great shift in the way
women participated in society and they way it viewed its women. Poland witnessed quite an
active women’s movement by the time emancipation had been granted. Adam Winiarz explored
the women question in the Kingdom of Poland during the nineteenth century, and notes that there
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was a crisis “in the traditional upbringing of Polish women.” 165 Winiarz wrote that by the middle
of the nineteenth century, “The roles of woman based on the family and the home, her total
dependence on men, her education…no longer suited the aspirations or the social needs of
women living in changing economic conditions.” 166 With this, Winiarz noted that a demand for
reform in the upbringing of Polish women and their education rose within Polish society. 167
Winiarz goes on to explore the bibliography of the literature written in the nineteenth
century Kingdom of Poland. He points to the important role of the “Enthusiasts,” those in Polish
society who supported women’s emancipation, in the development of an emancipation
movement in Poland. 168 The enthusiasts of the mid-nineteenth century led to the more organized
emancipationists (emancypantki) towards the end of the nineteenth century resulted in 1907 the
formation of the Union of Equal Rights for Polish Women. 169 In Russian Poland, Robert
Blobaum points out, “…The first wave of Polish feminists were comprised of women from elite
backgrounds, or at least from elites defined more in terms of education than of wealth, which
was reflected in their concerns for access to higher education and professional employment.” 170
The women’s movement occurred among the elite women of Polish society, which “did not
require the existence of a core group of affluent middle class women and allied male reformers,
as had been the case particularly in Great Britain and the United States.” 171
Both Blobaum and Winiarz point to the effect of the Revolution of 1905 in regards to the
women’s movement, as was witnessed above in the Estonian case as well. An easing of political
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repression from the Tsar saw women’s organizations in Poland “immediately transformed into
open organizations and associations.” 172 Blobaum expands on three waves of thought in regards
to the “woman question” in Russian Poland, noting a liberal, nationalist, Roman Catholic, and
feminist strand to the position of women in Polish society.173 Of the different thoughts, Blobaum
concludes, “The Polish nationalist movement, whose response to the “woman question” would
ultimately prove the most influential as it came to dominate the larger political discourse on the
Polish “nation,” viewed women as bearers and nurturers of peculiarly Polish values and equated
patriotic duties with those of motherhood and child-rearing.”174 Therefore, though women won
the right to vote with Polish independence in 1918, the feminist movement of the early 20 th
century lost to the prevailing nationalist discourse of the day, which placed women in the Matka
Polka (Polish Mother) role rather than one of greater equality.
The interwar period saw the restoration of an independent Poland under Józef Piłsudski,
who led a government that is much celebrated in Poland today. Before the Second World War,
women possessed dismally low percentages in the Sejm and Senat, possessing two percent and
five percent of the seats respectively. 175 World War II devastated Poland, stripping it of its
statehood in 1939 by the Germans and Soviets, before it became the firing ground for both the
Nazis and Soviets. The country’s experience in the Second World War left many disheartened
and embittered in Polish society. The influence of Soviet-style communism spread to Poland
after the war, leading to the establishment of the People’s Republic of Poland, which lasted until
1989. The twists and turns of the Polish story line after 1989 have led to a democratic state that
has been at the forefront of the post-communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe.
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Although the percentages of women in the Sejm increased after World War II,
traditionalist notions of the role of woman in Polish society remained. Anna Titkow notes that
the late reincarnation of statehood, following over a century of division and foreign rule, “created
the model of the heroic Polish woman coping with all sorts of burdens.” 176 This model woman
was supposed to bring up children while “maintaining the national language, culture, and
religious faith.”177 The role of the Catholic Church is monumental in Polish culture, placing the
fundamentals of Church teaching at the foundation of Polish society. These values admired in
Polish women, combined in the idealized image of the Matka Polka, for almost all of its history
continued during communist times and made the role of women in Poland strikingly different
than that of the role of the Western woman, who had not faced years of strife and national
persecution. The tumultuous history of the partitions, independence, and then communist rule
under Soviet domination strengthened the adherence to traditions in Polish Catholic culture,
since stability has been fleeting in the modern period.
The role of the Catholic Church has been pivotal in Polish history and culture. A. KempWelch, in his history of Poland under communism, writes, “As always in Polish history, the
Church served as a repository of national ideals and as a sanctuary in times of trouble.” 178 The
Catholic Church is what has enabled Poles to sustain and construct their national identity,
especially during the onslaught of war, Soviet communism, and the painful transition to
democracy and capitalism. Most notable is the idea that “the Church would never compromise its
ethical principles with any materialistic ideology.”179 The permanence of the Church in Polish
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society suggests a permanence in the ideas about women and men in Polish culture, and leaves
the hope for achieving greater gender equality somewhat blocked by a religious wall.

4.2 Polish Women under Communist Rule
With the installation of a Soviet-style system after World War II, Poland once again
faced foreign domination and isolation behind the Iron Curtain. The ideology of communism
allowed for women potentially to be seen as equals among men, but Polish women were still
required to be strong and persevere in nurturing Polish cultural values, namely the values
associated with the Catholic Church. By virtue of its Catholicism, Poland was able to create its
own form of communism, distinct yet still connected to the Soviets. Women, under communism,
as noted above, enjoyed relative equality with their male comrades on paper. The ideology of
communism provided that all workers and citizens were equal and worked for the common good
of society, even if society was lacking in the many material advances seen under capitalism. This
supposed gender equality was rooted in the ideology of communism, but would take up a
defensive position against the values and traditions of the Catholic Church innate in Polish
society.
Elzbieta Oleksy highlights:
Formally, in the period of roughly forty years after the Second World War, Polish
women enjoyed rights that Western women might have envied. In agreement with
the Marxist doctrine that women’s emancipation entails their integration into the
labor market, the Polish Constitution of 1952 gave women full civil and political
rights, as well as access to most trades and professions, many of them formerly in
the male preserve. The state legalized abortion and divorce and declared (though
never fully realized this promise) to provide free child care facilities. 180
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The Polish Constitution of 1952 provided women with many rights, including the right of
employment in traditional male-dominated professions, as well as rights to divorce and abortion.
With admission into male trades and professions, the opportunity came for greater gender
equality through the labor force and the potential for women to hold equal positions of power in
the communist government. However, this was simply not the outcome of the Polish
Constitution of 1952.
Although the lives of most women under communism were not luxurious, they did not
face dramatic and outright gender inequality under communism as they were to face with the
introduction of capitalism and democracy. The socialist system “promoted gender equality in
education, labor, leisure, family, and public life.”181 Equality in leisure time, although it was
promoted in the ideology, could hardly be seen during communist times. Not only did Polish
women have to work in the labor force in building socialism alongside their male comrades, but
they also had to be in charge of the household.
Małgorzata Fidelis has written an excellent study on the experience of women in postwar
Poland, emphasizing the situation of women under communism and the industrialization of the
postwar period. Fidelis examines the shift in the government policy on women from promoting
their participation in the labor force to shifting and placing them in gender-defined occupations,
all within two decades. The drastic change in policy led Fidelis to write, “Women were to enter
en masse into jobs traditionally performed by men, but those jobs were now redesigned as
exclusively or primarily female jobs. Through the policy of “regendering from above,” the
socialist workplace offered a peculiar kind of gender equality, in which the boundary between
men’s and women’s work “was redrawn, but not erased. Thus the persistent reassertion of sexual
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difference in employment policies reinforced a gender hierarchy that the communists,
paradoxically, sought to obliterate through instituting political and legal equality of the sexes.” 182
Fidelis continues, “Although Soviet leaders were just as eager as their Polish counterparts
to demote female workers, Poles continued to believe that women in the new occupations
represented a Soviet imposition on Polish national culture. For them, strengthening gender
hierarchies was also a way to reassert national identities and set themselves apart from the
Soviets.”183 Fidelis interestingly argues that the reversion to prewar gender stereotypes at the end
of the communist era was a result of Poles reasserting their nationality and culture, which had
been challenged by communism. Thus, gender equality was something associated with
communism and separate spheres for men and women were Polish, and important to retain.
Fidelis notes, “A woman performing a man’s job was a threat not only to proper femininity but
to Polishness as well.”184An example of this reversion of gender norms can be witnessed with the
drastic drop in the number of female representatives emerging from the first elections in postcommunist Poland.
The first years of communist Poland saw attempts at extensive industrialization, requiring
the recruitment of women into the labor force and the “tendency to break through traditional
attitudes against professional work for women and their participation in social and political
life.”185 Following the Stalinist era, a change in policy towards women’s roles in Polish society
became prevalent in the second decade of communist rule. Władysław Adamski writes:
A reorientation of policy regarding women occurred in the years from 1955 to
1957: greater attention was not being given to the family than to professional
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work for women. In the 1960s, the trend was to equalize the two approaches to
the role of women in society. A new element of social policy appeared to continue
the approach adopted in the first years of extensive industrialization, while
emphasizing the role of the woman as mother, wife, and housekeeper.186
The change in policy towards women was reflected in the number of women represented in the
Sejm. Małgorzata Fuszara, in her examination of women in the Polish parliament in the
communist period, cites a figure of 17 percent of women in the Sejm for the period 1952-1956.187
The rise in female representatives correlates with the more egalitarian approach towards
women’s roles in society and government in general in the first decade of communist rule.
Interestingly, however, a dramatic decline was noted in the following period, 1956-1961, where
women only accounted for four percent of the deputies. 188 For the rest of the 1960s and 1970s,
women made up an average of around 14 percent of deputies in the Sejm.189 The 1980s saw a rise
in the proportion of women in parliament, averaging around 21 percent of the deputies, yet the
transition to democracy again led to a sharp drop in women’s representation. 190
Małgorzata Fuszara and Eleonora Zielińska warn of false impressions in their analysis of
women’s representation during the communist period, by stating:
Any attempt to evaluate women’s impact on the law during that period is futile,
since citizens had no real influence on the legislative process because all decisions
were made by the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party
[PZPR]. Since the representation of women in that body was purely symbolic, it is
highly probable that any decisions made were in fact undertaken by men. After
the collapse of Communism, the gender distribution of power did not change
considerably. 191
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Fuszara and Zielińska argue that although Polish women, and men, possessed representation in
the Sejm, they did not hold any power. Siemienska goes on to note, “The presence of female
faces was thus ensured, but these women did not represent the best and brightest of Polish
society.”192 However, despite the lack of the “best and the brightest” women, the symbolic
pressure of women in any institution of power was important for retaining and promoting a
female presence in the public realm, even if it was largely a façade under the communist regime.
Moreover, very few women held positions in the government itself, and “the few that were only
played a symbolic role to “prove” that there was not discrimination.”193 The “symbolic role”
played by these women was an important step in allowing the public to see women in politics,
despite the seemingly useless nature of the governmental positions that they held. Ania Plomien
notes, however, that the communist government did attempt to enact the policy of gender
equality through institutionalization with the creation of the Office of the Government
Plenipotentiary for Women’s Affairs in 1986. 194 This office was “to ensure the equal status of
women and men in government, political, economic, social and cultural arenas.” 195
With the end of communism in Poland, the transition to democracy and capitalism began
in full force in 1989, and women’s role in the transition was as marginalized as it had been in the
seemingly powerless positions they held in the communist government. It must be highlighted,
however, that though women were involved in Solidarity, and “the movement relied heavily on
women’s involvement, it did not address women’s concerns.”196 Shana Penn, in her seminal
work on women’s involvement in Solidarity, notes, “But the Solidarity men consistently
192
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overlooked the movement’s heroines, who, for their part, did not challenge the subordinate
position they were allotted.”197 Penn’s work examines the work of the women that kept the
underground newspapers alive during martial law in Poland. Interestingly, the majority of the
women did not claim their role as leaders of democracy in Poland, but rather, stood aside as the
public faces of Solidarity, all men, took the credit for Solidarity’s success. Moreover, as Oleksy
writes, “The achievement of these women has been erased from collective memory.” 198 The
avoidance of women’s issues by Solidarity and its new government undermined the emergence
of a women’s movement and support for women during the transition, leaving those women who
had helped take down communism in Poland disheartened and left out.

4.3 Polish Women in Transition, 1989-2004
The class distinctions that plague capitalism were not seen to such an extent under
socialism. The shaky economy and newly implemented free market led to the loss of many jobs
that had been guaranteed under communism. This new economic reality was difficult and
painful for Polish families who could not be supported by a single income. It was especially
difficult when women’s participation in the labor force was particularly jeopardized in the
transition.199 Male hegemony in politics, industry, and other traditionally masculine sectors
reappeared, leaving many women unemployed and floundering to support their families.
This exclusion and inequality of women in the workforce led to one of the contradictions
in the return to traditional gender roles in Poland. Although some women were seemingly happy
to return to the sphere of domesticity, others were forced to seek employment in order to support
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their families while the economy stabilized. However, with the rise of the Catholic influence in
Polish political culture and society, women were once again viewed as inferior to men in the
public realm. This led to inequality in wages, labor, and job availability along with little say in
the political or economic transition. These prejudices made it impossible for many women to
find employment at all, despite their high levels of university education. 200
Poland is a relative success story in the transition from an authoritarian government and
command economy to democracy and free markets because it “sought to embrace neoliberalism
quickly and thoroughly.”201 However, the development of capitalism and democracy in Poland
brought about a reversion to traditional gender roles that were prevalent before the communist
era. Although the first Polish post-communist government and its successors were quick to adopt
democratic principles, their adoption of gender equality or recognition of women’s issues as a
concern for society has been slow. The importance of women in Polish society did not go
unnoticed in Poland, but continuation of the exclusion of women from the political realm
remains problematic.
The immense amount of pressure on women during communist times to work in both
realms placed a great burden on women, making the arrival of capitalism and democracy and a
return to the traditional gender roles welcomed by many women. 202 Based on the Catholic
Church’s values and norms, women were to return to the domestic realm to raise families and
take care of their husbands, whereas men were to remain as breadwinners for their growing
Catholic families. This traditional dichotomy suited the women who had been subject to the
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double burden during socialist times of participation in the labor force and maintaining an ideal
communist household.
Plomien notes, “In contrast to the previous era, the state’s dedication to equal
opportunities (even if mostly superficial) and women’s professional activation was not sustained
through the transition period.”203 The superficial attempts at gender equality were eradicated
with the transition. Even the institutionalization of gender equality in 1986 with the Office of the
Government Plenipotentiary for Women’s Affairs was undermined by converting the office in
1991 “into the Office of Undersecretary of State for Women and Family with new
responsibilities for family, children and youth.” 204 The inclusion of family and youth into the
Office of Women’s Affairs further placed women in the stereotypical role of wife and mother,
rather than focusing exclusively on the important women’s issues that were present with the
transition, such as unemployment and poverty. Furthermore, a survey conducted in 1995 by the
Center for Public Opinion Research (Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej) noted that a majority
of Poles felt that women were worse off in their professional and social lives than their male
counterparts, with only 23 percent believing women and men were equal in this area. 205
Both Urszula Nowakowska and Ania Plomien point to the rise of the political right and
cultural conservatives at the time of transition in Poland, which affected the position of women
in society. Plomien writes, “The right-leaning government went as far as advising women to
return to their households and take up their motherly and wifely duties in order to make jobs
available for men.”206 As Nowakowska, writing in the mid-1990s, noted, “The Catholic Church
and closely cooperating right-wing parties have created a very unfavorable political climate for
203
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women’s rights. They propagate traditional, patriarchal models of the family, with a man at its
head.”207 The rise of the right-wing and the power of the Church showed itself during the
transition, filling the void that Marxist ideology had once occupied. The Church in Poland, at the
time of transition and since its completion, has promoted “women’s role as wife and mother and
as the only morally correct one.” 208 Therefore, women were not encouraged to seek public office
or attempt to obtain equality in political institutions. Nowakowska concluded, “Instead of
building a pluralistic society, we have just replaced quasi-religious Marxist ideology with the
only one right doctrine, namely, that of the Catholic Church.” 209
The rise of the right as well as the Church’s increasing political role in the early 1990s
was reflected in the dramatic drop in women’s representation in the Sejm and Senate. Women
made up only 9.56 percent, or 44 seats, of the 460 member Sejm after the 1991 elections. 210
Women fared somewhat better in the 1993 elections, winning 60 seats, raising their presence in
the Sejm to 13 percent.211 Although women faced low levels of representation, “a positive
initiative to overcome such prejudice was taken up by a cross-party group of women
politicians.”212 Barbara Einhorn describes the initiative by female parliamentarians:
Defying resistance from male politicians, they set up in spring 1991 the first ever
Parliamentary Club of Women Deputies under the chair of Barbara Labuda. Forty
of the total 62 women deputies in the Sejm and seven female senators joined.
They saw the function of this Women’s Caucus as monitoring women’s interests
in relation to legislative changes under consideration by the Polish Sejm. 213
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The cooperation among women in the Sejm and Senat provided hope for advancing women’s
issues in Poland as well as promoting the presence of women in parliament. The club also sought
to delegitimize the stereotypes of women held by male parliamentarians.
Moreover, the appointment of Anna Popowicz was an example of a woman promoted to
a ministerial position in the post-communist Polish government. Nowakowska wrote, “When, for
example, Walesa appointed a minister of women’s affairs, the bishops appealed for a minister
who was Catholic, married, at least forty years old, and with two or more children. They got
what they wanted, but they overlooked the fact that Miss Popowicz did not support a ban on
abortion.”214 Popowicz, showing a public challenge to the prevalent hegemonic masculinity
represented in Walesa, was eventually dismissed. Despite her dismissal, her appointment and the
creation of the Under-Secretary of State for Women and Family Affairs was often cited as
Poland’s attempt at becoming European in the eyes of Western media. 215
Another example of a woman who reached a high level in the Polish post-communist
government was Hanna Suchocka. Her appointment as Prime Minister in 1992, at first glance,
appeared as a victory for women’s representation in post-communist Poland. The abortion debate
at the time of transition caused much controversy in Poland, especially among right-wing
conservatives who sought to ban abortion entirely. Therefore, “Hanna Suchocka was elected to
the post as a compromise candidate, not because she is a constitutional lawyer, nor because of
her term as Poland’s representative on the council of Europe, but precisely, it seems, because of
her uncompromising stance in opposition to abortion.”216 Suchocka was not an advocate for
women’s issues, but was seeking to continue to traits associated with the hegemonic femininity
expected of a Polish woman. Suchocka, as Einhorn described her, “seem[ed] both to epitomize
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and to laud the traditional view of women’s qualities currently espoused by so many political
ideologues in East Central Europe.”217 Though she was in a prime position to promote a platform
for gender equality, she looked to pass a legislative ban on abortion in Poland through the Polish
parliament, restricting the physical freedom of Polish women in regards to their bodies.
Female politicians, like the former Prime Minister of Poland, Hanna Suchocka, have not
wholeheartedly emphasized or advocated for women’s rights in the political realm, so many
women are not convinced or influenced to vote for these women. 218 Hanna Suchocka, though
the Prime Minister of Poland, characterized the qualities that are found in Connell’s emphasized
femininity and Schippers’ hegemonic femininity rather than characterizing a figure determined
to challenge Poland’s rigid gender stereotypes at the time of transition. Though she was part of a
small minority of female politicians, she reached high office because of her conservative views
that would allow for the continuation of subordinating women in Polish society from the top to
the bottom.
Katja Guenther goes on to explain why the women’s movement has not been successful
in Poland by noting that there has been little encouragement for the public inclusion of feminist
goals in national politics. 219 Furthermore, Monika Platek writes, “Contrary to popular belief, one
women Prime Minister, one woman Chair of the National Bank or one woman Minister will not
change the social situation or image of women. Women who hold high office do not become
supporters of women’s rights just because they themselves are women. In fact, they often act to
the contrary.”220 If ordinary women cannot be confident that women operating in the political
realm will be advocates for their rights, then the political apathy of women will continue in
217
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Poland. The drop of female representatives in parliament in addition to the lack of effective
females in top positions during the transition period left a bleak foundation for the involvement
of women in politics in Poland.
The turbulent transition for Polish women had certainly stabilized by the beginning of the
21st century as compared with the early to mid 1990s. The contradictions and further burdens
brought on by capitalism should not be viewed in a uniformly negative light, however. Only
time can tell if these burdens are to lessen and Titkow provided an optimistic outlook on the
future of gender equality in Poland in stating, “The political and economic transformation going
on in Poland, however negative it may appear for women, should be seen as only a factor
modifying the process of achieving gender equality.” 221 Titkow’s hope for gender equality has
made some progress in Poland, but today’s Polish woman continues to face a difficult time in
regards to gender equality on a governmental level.
The governments during the second half of the period of transition, particularly from
1993 to 1997, came from the left side of the political spectrum, and “were more involved in
promoting equal opportunities, especially after the 1995 Women’s Conference in Beijing.” 222
Furthermore, a National Action Plan for Women was embraced, which sought to fight poverty
among women, provide access to education and medical care, fight violence against women, and
create an “institutionalizing mechanism for the advancement of women and facilitating women’s
involvement in power and decision-making.”223 Of course, these policies did not last long, but
the fact that they were developed showed that progress was possible in providing a voice for
women.
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The return of a conservative government in 1997, however, “questioned the need to
introduce an equal status bill, to investigate pay and gender equity in the labor market or to
introduce a political quota system.”224 The step backwards by the conservative government on
women’s issues was once again addressed by the new government in 2001, which again came
from the left side of the political spectrum.225 This pattern leads Plomien to observe “that the
process of crafting a new gender contract is one characterized by progress and retreat, depending
on the political orientation of the administration in power.” 226 Gender equality, however, is
addressed in the 1997 Polish Constitution,
Article 33 of the Constitution states that ‘men and women shall have equal rights
(…) regarding education, employment and promotion, and shall have the right to
equal compensation for work of similar value, to social security, to hold office,
and to receive public honors and decorations.227
The 1997 Constitution ensured gender equality in all aspects of life in Poland, but a long battle
still lay ahead for a better framework of gender equality in order for women to be truly equal in
Polish society. Furthermore, the role of the Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment, which was
created in response to EU discussions for accession, through its years of transformation and
changes in its title, is now responsible for what is in its namesake, equal treatment throughout
Poland.228
The percentage of female representatives in the Sejm and Senat remained quite low
throughout the transition period, and the 1997 elections did not provide women with any
progress, with only 13 percent of the Sejm consisting of female parliamentarians. 229 The
following election years, however, appeared as great victories for women in Poland. A leap of
224

Ibid, 251.
Ibid, 251.
226
Ibid, 251.
227
Dorota Szelewa for European Parliament, “The Policy on Gender Equality in Poland,” May 2011,5.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110725ATT24649/20110725ATT24649EN.pdf
228
Plomien, 264.
229
“Inter Parliamentary Union- Poland-Sejm-Election Archives”
225

81

seven percent was seen with the 2001 elections, allowing for 93 women to join the ranks of
parliamentarians. 230 Interestingly, ‘of those women that were elected to parliament, 61.3 percent
were new to politics.”231 Furthermore, the number of females in ministerial positions rose from 7
percent in 1995 to about 25 percent in 2005. 232
A further public opinion survey was conducted in 2002 asking, “What is it like to be a
Woman in Poland?” The survey noted that 48 percent of male and 46 percent of female
respondents believed that is was better to be a man in Poland than a woman, whereas as only 12
percent of female respondents and 6 percent of male respondents believed that it was better to be
a female in Poland. 233 The survey continues by asking the respondents whether women and men
with the same qualifications have the same opportunities, to which, 65 percent of the female
respondents and 58 percent of the male respondents answered that women have fewer
opportunities than men in regards to career opportunities. 234 These results indicate the
continuation of the subordination of women in Polish society, despite increased numbers of
female representatives in the Sejm.
Renata Siemienska has devoted much of her research to the pivotal election year of 2001
that saw a substantial increase in women in the Polish parliament. Siemienska notes, “The 2001
parliamentary elections were a turning point for women in Parliament, due in part to the
implementation of the new electoral law.”235 The new law reduced the number of districts, which
in turn, increased the constituencies. The reduction of districts as Siemienska explains, “gave an
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advantage to larger parties, which needed to fill their party lists with more candidates and were
therefore inclined to add more women to them. As a result of these changes, substantially more
women were elected to both the Sejm and the Senate.” 236 Siemienska expands on the larger
parties, by noting their adoption of gender quotas:
[the]Coalition of Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union as well as the liberalcenter Freedom Union, accepted the rule that neither of the sexes should be
represented by less than 30 percent of all candidates, and lists presented for
individual constituencies should comply with this condition. Moreover, even
right-wing parties, such as the League of Polish Families, were influenced by
these changes. 237
Despite the adoption of gender quotas by individual parties, no national quota was enforced and
the selection of candidates was still made entirely by men. 238 Fuszara and Zielińska, writing in
2006, added that since the fall of communism, “few political parties took women’s questions into
consideration. Many parties did not address women’s issues at all, and some did only in the
context of the family and women’s roles within the family.”
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that, “The problem of the equal status of women and men, women’s political participation and
other women’s issues were rarely included in party programs for the 2001 electoral
campaign.”240 Although the greater number of women in parliament “reflected changes in
attitudes toward women in politics,”241 the lack of acknowledgment of women’s issues by the
political parties and leaders showed little hope for a true change in gender equality in Poland
with the 2001 elections.
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4.4 Polish Women After Transition, 2004-2012
The ground-breaking election of 2001 was followed by the success of women in the
subsequent elections of 2005, 2007, and 2011. The election years of 2005 and 2007 saw the
retention by women of around 20 percent of the seats in the Polish parliament, whereas the year
2011 saw further growth in female representatives, with women making up almost 24 percent of
parliamentarians. 242 The rising numbers of female politicians in Poland can be counted as a
partial success in regards to gender equality, yet the road to full equality is still bumpy and filled
with contradictions and road blocks for Polish women. However, given the continual rise in
female representation, perhaps the phenomenon of women occupying important positions within
institutions of power no longer appears as atypical.
The results of my survey conducted for the Polish case study are skewed in favored of the
Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska), as the majority of the seventeen respondents belonged
to that party. However, the percentage of women belonging to the Civic Platform are a majority
of women serving in the Sejm and Senat, which therefore accurately reflects the make-up of
women in the two houses. Cooperation of female parliamentarians in completing the survey was
much harder to come by, despite a much larger number of women in the Polish Sejm and Senat
than was seen with the Estonian Riigikogu. However, much more research has been conducted
on Poland and its post-communist situation than Estonia, making the survey supplemental to
previous research. Only one female parliamentarian from Law and Justice (Prawo I
Sprawiedliwość) responded, as well as one member from Palikot’s Movement (Ruch Palikota),
The Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratyczne), and United Poland (Soldarna
Polska). The length of time that the female parliamentarians had been in parliament varied much

242

“Inter Parliamentary Union-Poland-Sejm-Election Archives”

84

more than in Estonia, with a variety of terms in office recorded.243 The majority of women polled
said they had not always wanted to be in politics but responded with “I used to think about it, and
circumstances allowed for it” or “It just kind of happened to where I joined a career in politics,”
when asked how they came by the career choice of being a politician.
Although progress in legislation and representation for women has fluctuated since the
transition, equality in education can be seen across the board in Poland, as a great many women
in Poland hold university degrees. 244 This can be viewed as a relic of communist times, but
remains in Poland to this day. Polish women continue to possess more higher education than
their male counterparts. Of those women in the Sejm and Senat surveyed for this thesis, all of the
women held a degree from institutions of higher education. 245 Therefore, the reversion to
traditional gender roles cannot be attributed to the ignorance of Polish women or inequality in
education, but rather the role of cultural norms and values.
Interestingly, the restoration of gender quotas was enacted in January 2011 in Poland,
creating more potential for women to be representatives. 246 The quotas were placed on electoral
lists for both the Sejm and the European Parliament and called for no less than 35 percent of a
gender on a candidate list.247 Despite the turbulent past with gender quotas, the majority of the
survey respondents approve of gender quotas, with only five disapproving of them. The quota for
the candidate list did not overflow into the parliamentary seats in 2012, as only eleven of the fifty
Polish representatives to the European Parliament are women. 248
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Despite the gender quotas and the presence of an all-female political party, the majority
of female parliamentarians who responded to my survey found being in politics was somewhat
difficult for them as a woman. Five respondents noted that they felt women are fully accepted as
political leaders in their country, whereas seven felt that they were somewhat accepted, and four
responded that women were not really accepted as political leaders in Poland. Furthermore, the
majority of women felt women’s issues were somewhat or not really heard by men in politics,
with three responding that they felt as though women’s issues were always heard. The
improvement in female representation in Poland after the 2001 elections provides hope for
women in Poland, yet, the percentage still lies below a quarter of all representatives. With further
integration with international norms and a curbing of Church influence, perhaps women in
Poland will be able to reach achieve greater equality in Polish institutions of power and
governance.
Even more intriguing was the formation of the “Women’s Party” in the 2007 elections.
Unfortunately the Women’s Party was not able to reach the five percent threshold, but the
presence of such a party on the political scene shows great strides in Poland’s attempt at gender
equality249. The Women’s Party subsequently joined ranks with the SLD, a party that “has
declared that it would retain a 40 percent gender quota on its candidate lists.” 250 Additionally, in
2011, “the government comprise[d] 19 Ministers, including 5 women, who [were] the head of
the following ministries: Labor and Social Policy, National Education, Science and Higher
Education, Health, and Regional Development.”251 Over the past four years, women have made
up around a quarter of the positions in the government, representing significant improvement,
though still unequal, in women’s representation in the upper echelons of power in Poland.
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Today in Poland, examples of hegemonic femininity and hegemonic masculinity, as well
as the subordination of other masculinities and femininities can be spotted across the political
spectrum. Beata Kempa, currently a member of the Sejm and the former Secretary of State in the
Ministry of Justice from May 2006 to November 2007, is an interesting example of the
characteristics that culminate to form the Polish form of hegemonic femininity, to follow
Schippers’ terminology. Kempa, after losing the election for the deputy marshal of the Sejm seat
in 2011 to Wanda Nowicka, gave a speech where she said, “I'm all for the cross and for Christian
values. I'm all for religion in schools and the traditional model of a Polish family. And today we
have the opportunity to bring an end to the discussion of whether the cross from the mother of
Blessed Father Jerzy Popieluszko is supposed to hang at this point or not. Decide.”252 Kempa is
also an active supporter of the “Stop Gender” campaign, aimed at enforcing a traditional notion
of family and gender roles in Polish society.
Additionally, Kempa was formerly a member of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, but was
part of a parliamentary faction of fifteen members that broke away in November 2011 and
formed the United Poland political party (Solidarna Polksa). Kempa was one of two females that
broke off with United Poland. The United Poland party is a party that is supportive of the notion
that men and women have certain roles in Polish society and are actively working towards the
maintenance of the traditional family model. Kempa is currently the vice president of the rightwing party that is pro-family at its center, thus, reinforcing the role of the woman as belonging in
the realm of domesticity in Poland, despite her presence in the national politics. Kempa’s
continual public reinforcements of maintaining the traditional gender roles and norms, while also
putting down any notion of a new form of femininity or masculinity appearing in Polish society,
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allows her to be described as an archetype of hegemonic femininity in Poland. Rather than
fighting for greater gender equality in politics, she advocates the continuation of the archetype of
the Polish woman as the Matka Polka.
Furthermore, Kempa notes, “I belong to a generation of Poles shaped by the ideals of the
democratic opposition and the teaching of John Paul II.” Though Kempa’s belief that family is
important is often no point of contestation for many Poles, but her rigid views on retaining the
traditional gender roles in Poland prevents any real gender equality to emerge even within her
own party. Though Kempa certainly is not the only female politician in Poland that embraces
such conservative values, she is certainly the most public and well-recognized female figurehead
for hegemonic femininity.
On the other side of the Polish political spectrum, Anna Grodzka made headlines
throughout the world when she was elected to the Polish Sejm in the elections of 2011 as the first
transgender member of parliament. 253 She is a deputy from the Palikot Movement (Ruch
Palikota) and was elected alongside Poland’s only openly homosexual male deputy in the Sejm,
Robert Biedroń. Though Grodzka has not been the first transgender parliamentarian in the
world,254 she is the only one currently presiding in a parliament. Grodzka has been very public
with her intent while in the public eye and wrote in a piece for The Guardian stating, “I put this
down to the unsettling challenge transgender people can represent to norms of masculinity and
femininity, which many hold dear. The fear and discomfort we can engender sometimes results
in mockery and contempt from those with power, including some well-known media
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commentators.”255 She has been a herald for change in Poland in regards to how the population
views its gender roles and norms, forcing many to reassess how functional the traditional gender
norms and roles really are in describing the citizens of a more modern Poland.
Grodzka is certainly an interesting example in regards to both hegemonic masculinity as
well as exhibiting characteristics of pariah femininity. Her election in an overwhelmingly
Catholic country with a strong conservative voice may simply be an outlier among traditional
gender roles, but it may also be a sign of change and modernization of the reigning hegemonic
masculinity. Not only does Grodzka upset the traditional notion of femininity, but she also upsets
and questions the role of masculinity in modern Polish society. Grodzka represents the
transgender challenge to hegemonic masculinity, but she additionally represents a challenge to
hegemonic femininity by exhibiting characteristics of a strong feminine presence on the national
level. Grodzka is an important key in the unpacking of gender norms in Polish society, as she has
the audience of an international community of transgendered persons and the conservative right.
In addition to challenging current gender norms and roles, Grodzka has been a target for
the right-wing media in Poland. Grodzka has faced media outbursts from Beata Kempa and
others in regards to Grodzka’s sexuality and appearance. Kempa and Grodzka represent such
extremes, that the Polish tabloid-newspaper Fakt enjoys writing a piece which put the two
against each other quite publically and unabashedly naming the article, “Kempa vs. Grodzka.”256
The metaphorical battle between the two notions of femininity is quite apparent in Poland and
indicates a public battle of sorts in regards to the current state of the Polish gender regime. Both
parties are seeking to adjust how gender is viewed in Poland, but are at opposite ends of the
255

Anna Grodzka, “As the World’s Only Transgender MP, I want o Ensure that Our Voices are Heard,” The
Guardian, May 17, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/17/transgender-mp-voices-heard
256
“The Struggle for Gender in the Sejm: Mayhem in the Parliament of Gender! Kempa vs. Grodzka,” Fakt, January
19, 2014, http://www.fakt.pl/kempa-nie-chce-grodzkiej-w-swoim-zespole-do-walki-zgender,artykuly,439774,1.html

89

proposed changes, with Kempa seeking to keep the matronly woman and Grodzka seeking to
reform the overall notion of gender and who is included in the concept.are seeking to end the
‘ideology of gender,’ yet for completely different reasons.
Though Kempa and Grodzka represent a visible application and contestation of
hegemonic masculinity and femininity in Poland, other female parliamentarians in Poland are
certainly worth mentioning in regards to challenging the prevailing hegemonic masculinity in
Polish culture and politics. Ewa Kopacz, like Anna Grodzka, has also made some waves in
regards to challenging traditional notions of women and Catholic beliefs in Polish society.
Kopacz was elected as the speaker of the Polish Sejm in 2011 and has held the position ever
since, being the first and only woman to occupy the position. She is also the vice-chairwoman of
the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska), currently the largest political party in the Sejm.
Kopacz also created waves in 2008 in Poland while she was the Health Minister through
allowing a 14 year-old Polish girl to be granted an abortion. 257 Pro-Life activists called for
Kopacz’s excommunication, as she is a practicing Catholic. Despite what she does in her
occupation, she still has to answer to the conservative voice and criticism within Poland.
Regardless of the uproar over Kopacz’s seemingly liberal approach to abortion, she has retained
popularity in regards to being a parliamentary deputy and the speaker of the male-dominated
Sejm.
A more consistent example of somewhat of a pariah femininity can be found in Krystyna
Łybacka, a politician from the SLD, Democratic Left Alliance. Łybacka is an example of a longstanding and well-respected female politician, as she was one of the few females elected in the
first free elections in post-communist Poland. Łybacka was also a former member of the
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communist party and served in the Polish Sejm. In addition to serving several terms in the Sejm,
Łybacka was also a former vice-chair of the national executive committee of the SLD and the
party’s parliamentary delegation.258 Furthermore, Łybacka, an avid social democrat, focusing on
education, also occupied the position of the Minister of National Education and Sport from 20012004. Her impressive resume suggests that the presence of a pariah femininity that challenges the
male presence within national politics in Poland.
With the presence of such strong women, even if they go along with current expectations
of hegemonic masculinity like Kempa, the representation of women appears to be on the
upswing. Additionally, Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the prospects for
better legal implementation of gender equality improved a great deal. Joining the EU and
adopting the acquis communautaire certainly strengthened Poland’s framework for gender
equality. 259 Moreover, Poland has agreed to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEWDAW) as well as the Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action. 260 Twelve respondents to the survey believe that gender inequality is an issue in Poland,
with only two believing that it is a top issue. With its entrance into the EU, Poland appears to
have embraced the legislative necessities in creating a framework for gender equality through the
increase of female representatives in parliament and in government as well as adopting directives
and laws that combat gender inequality.
These changes can be witnessed with the development of the Women’s Congress
(Kongres Kobiet) has swept the scene in regards to opening up a discourse on women’s issues
and the gender inequality persistent in Polish society. Formed in 2009, the organization describes
itself as “a movement that brings together women from all over Poland, irrespective of their
258
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views, origin, class, profession, and membership in parties, organizations, and background. It
does not represent any political party, nor does it associate itself with any specific interests or
programs.”261 The Congress has held five sessions, with the first two sessions focusing on
various issues, including “introducing gender parity in electoral lists, appointing an independent
plenipotentiary for equal treatment, issuing an annual parliamentary report about the situation of
women” to name a few.262 The Women’s Congress helped the changes to the electoral laws of
January 2011 in regards to more gender equality on the candidate lists enter the parliament. The
fifth session occurred in June 2013 and had around 8,500 attendees from all over Poland and the
world who particpated under the slogan “Partnership, Diversity, Solidarity.” 263 The Women’s
Congress is a remarkable and encouraging outpouring of support for change in Polish society in
regards to gender roles and what can be done to change the inequality.
Through international pressure, Poland has begun to embrace initiatives that attempt to
tackle the issues of gender inequality. Though the Catholic Church still holds firm roots in Polish
society, the infiltration of international gender norms and a more open discourse on gender
equality has opened up the processes for change and evolution in the Central European country.
Moreover, with the election of more women that go against the standard norms of hegemonic
masculinity and the traditional gender norms, such as Grodzka and Kopacz, perhaps a greater
public discourse and debate will be developed in Poland with the end result being further gender
equality.
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CHAPTER 5
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Though both Estonia and Poland possess a recurring trend of hegemonic masculinity in
their societies, there are continuities and ruptures within the comparison of the two postcommunist states. In both cases the double burden of women is inherent in the basic structure of
gender relations, in which women are required to be present and contribute to both the realm of
domesticity and to the workforce. Though the roles may appear to be equally as important in
regards to the livelihood of the nation, the reality entails the continual hegemony of masculinity
over the subordinated femininity, thus leaving women largely out of state power and decisionmaking. Additionally, in both countries, nationalism played a major role in the development of
gender relations, where men are the creators of the nation and women are simply the caretakers.
The rhetoric of nationalism in regards to women’s role in society is used as justification of the
subsequent gender roles that were developed in each country.
Furthermore, both cases saw a rise in the percentage of female parliamentarians
with the accession to the European Union in 2004. The European Union, as a whole, has
experienced an increase in the numbers of female representatives in the national parliaments.
With the expansion of the EU also came an increase in gender equality since 1990, where
women only made up 15.88 percent of parliamentarians in national parliaments. 264 As of 2012,
women made up 25.76 percent of national parliamentarians in the European Union, leaving
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Poland and Estonia not too far behind the average in the region. 265 As Connell noted in his 1987
work, “For the ultimate goal of the transformation of gender relations there are two logical
candidates. One is the abolition of gender and the other its reconstitution on new bases.”266 The
accession to the EU provides new foundations from which policies and notions of gender
equality can be built and expanded. Furthermore, both countries adopted gender equality
legislation before joining the EU. Though it is important to note that both Estonia and Poland
were required to adopt such legislation in order to join the EU and it is somewhat doubtful that
the two countries would have independently adopted such legislation at the time had it not been
part of the acquis. Despite this, women have made more progress in Poland in terms of
representation, but both countries have made significant progress in the framework towards
gender equality.
Though both states possess a communist past, they diverge in the significance of the role
of organized religion among the population. As for Poland, the role of the Church and the rise of
conservative forces are often cited for the continued subordination of women in power and
politics. In this sense, the importance of organized religion in regards to cultural transmission of
what is deemed masculine and feminine in Poland should not be overlooked. The Church has
played a hand in enforcing the rigid gender roles throughout Polish history, by emphasizing the
importance of the Matka Polka and her important contributions to the Polish nation through
child-rearing. Though the Catholic Church is important in the culture of Poles, it is also
reinforced by the underlying notion that in the dichotomy of gender relations, masculinity holds
sway over femininity, as well as other masculinities, in Polish society. The examples of Anna
Grodzka and Beata Kempa summarize the debate on the importance and significance of gender
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in the 21st century in Poland. The significant role of the Church, a habitual patriarchal institution,
and its connection to Polish nationalism has provided hegemonic masculinity with an avenue to
power and towards the subordination of women, offered to the Poles as for the greater good.
The closeness of the Church and the state in Polish history and politics drastically differs
from the Estonians. An interesting factor emerges when one observes the lack of religiosity in
Estonia, yet the persistence of rigid gender roles is somewhat of a misnomer in the small country.
Though it identifies with its northern neighbors, Estonia has great strides to make in regards to
gender equality. Though the country has programs aimed at decreasing the gender inequality
seen throughout the public and private sectors of society, the influence of a patriarchal party
system and lack of a rigid public discourse on equality will continue to leave Estonia with less
than equal results in regards to equality in its national parliament.
A hegemonic masculinity, though coming from different roots and sources, is prevalent
in both societies, preventing true gender equality in politics, as well as the rest of society. The
increase in the percentage of women in parliaments in both Poland and Estonia since the fall of
communism can be attributed to the influx of international norms, directives, and laws that have
been placed upon these societies, such as the EU’s policies on gender equality, thus, forcing
hegemonic masculinity to reformat itself to allow for the influx of the norms.
There is not such a religious factor or variable in Estonia, resulting in less extremism and
more centrism, which prevents any change at all and also allows for less focus on the gender
roles in the society…resulting in the maintenance of the status quo.
While the Estonian female parliamentarians discussed above appear to be relatively soft
spoken in regards to gender equality, their presence in the Riigikogu is a challenge to the
prevailing Estonian hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity appears in Estonia mainly
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through the rigid stereotypes that are enforced through the media, as was noted with Kadri
Simson. Though Simson and her female colleagues are well-educated public figures, they are
still held to the same standards that all Estonian women are held to, that of beauty and
subordination. Hegemonic femininity, though not overly present among the Estonian female
parliamentarians, is quite clear within Estonian society. The continual supremacy of hegemonic
masculinity in the power of the state in Estonia prevents politics as becoming an arena for gender
equality. When one examines the trends of women in Estonian political institutions, one finds
that despite the various ideologies, from communism to neo-liberalism, women are still viewed
as poorly qualified for national politics and are seemingly unable to make great strides in
increasing their representation. Thus the cultural foundations of gender relations in Estonian
society must be examined, rather than the various ideologies that Estonians have endured over
the twentieth century. Hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity are quite present in
Estonian society in regards to representation in the national legislative body, with hegemonic
masculinity controlling the forces of power in society, and hegemonic femininity supporting the
subordination of women in institutions of power through continued allowance and acceptance of
the gender roles.
Though the two countries may differ in the appearance and cause of the unequal gender
relations, the results are similar in regards to overall gender equality and the percentage of
female representation at a national level. The unequal gender relations that have been prevalent
for much of Estonia and Poland’s existence should certainly not be viewed as permanent,
however. With the arrival of new norms and mores regarding gender equality, hegemonic
masculinity could begin to incorporate notions of equality, thus giving away some of its
hegemony in order to establish peace within gender relations, which, as Connell notes, are
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always an area of tension. After completing the comparative case study it becomes apparent that
a cultural force is present in each society, though formed from different roots, that prevents the
equal representation of women and men in the national parliaments in the post-communist states
examined above. The explanation put forth in this thesis as to why this underrepresentation
continues, despite regime change and an influx of international norms and directives, is the
presence of a hegemonic masculinity that exists and subordinates women and their ability to
obtain equal power in the public realm. Finally, through the catalyst of accession to the European
Union and adopting gender equality legislation and programs, both Poland and Estonia have
evolved in positive and productive ways in regards to their gender equality practices since the
democratic transition of the 1990s.
This thesis has attempted to uncover an explanation as to why women continue to hold
low percentages in the national parliaments of post-communist states, with a focus on Estonia
and Poland. The work used the low numbers of women in parliament as an indicator of the level
of gender equality in each society. By using Connell and others’ concept of hegemonic
masculinity, this thesis explained that in the current regime of gender relations, gender equality
has not been and will not be realized. It is only through a complete reworking of the idea of
gender or the incorporation of femininity into power-sharing with the masculine ideals that
equilibrium will be realized. An in-depth look at the past two decades has provided insight into
the evolution of gender relations on a national and international level in Estonia and Poland.
With the upcoming election years, the outlook for women in terms of equality and representation
in both counties has improved. However, following Connell’s argument, it will take the changing
of the rule of hegemonic masculinity, which is no easy feat, for the subordination of women to

97

cease in each society and for a fostering notion of gender equality to become prevalent in public
discourse.
Unfortunately, the reworking of gender relations requires time and the problem of gender
inequality cannot be remedied overnight. However, through persistent discourse on gender
equality and an increase in the number of women’s voices being heard, change can occur in all
societies. Estonia has made inroads in opening a discourse on gender equality through
government programs, and Poland has enacted gender quotas in hopes of increasing female
representation at a national level. Through the normalization of women appearing in the upper
echelons of power, a greater voice for women can be developed, potentially questioning the
gender regime that has been in place for centuries in Estonia and Poland. The future holds the
key for gender equality in not only Poland and Estonia, but the region as a whole.
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APPENDIX 1

Below is a copy of the survey sent to the current female parliamentarians in the Estonian
Riigikogu and Polish Sejm and Senat. The surveys were sent out in Estonian and Polish and the
respondents answered anonymously.

Married: Yes or No
Children: Yes or No
Higher Education: Yes or No
Political Party (Choose One):
Estonia
Social Democratic Party
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union Group
Estonian Reform Party
Estonian Centre Party

Poland
Civic Platform
Law and Justice
Palikot’s Movement
The Democratic Left Alliance
Polish People’s Party
United Poland

How long have you been in politics? (both local and national)
a. 1 term or less
b. 2-3 terms
c. 4 or more terms
Have you always wanted to be in politics?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Indifferent
What led you to pursue a career in politics?
a. I have always wanted to be in politics.
b. I used to think about it, and circumstances allowed for it.
c. It just kind of happened to where I joined a career in politics.
d. Other
Have you found being in politics difficult as a woman?
a. Yes
b. Somewhat difficult
c. No, not difficult
Do you feel that women are fully accepted as political leaders in your country?
a. Yes, fully accepted
b. Somewhat accepted
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c. Not really accepted
d. No, not accepted at all
Women make up less than a quarter of the upper level government in Estonia/Poland. Do you
feel as though women’s issues are heard by men?
a. Yes, they are always heard.
b. Somewhat heard.
c. Not really heard.
d. Not heard at all.
Would you consider yourself a feminist?
a. Yes
b. No
c. No opinion
Do you approve of gender quotas in politics?
a. Yes, I fully approve
b. Somewhat approve
c. Somewhat disapprove
d. No, I do not approve
Do you believe that gender equality is a very important issue currently in Estonia/Poland?
a. Yes, it is a top issue.
b. It is somewhat an issue, but other issues such as the economy are more important.
c. It is not really an important issue.
d. It is not an issue at all.
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